

THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XIV.

JUNE, 1936.

No. 2.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS.¹

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It is much to be feared that the more a writer on one of the social sciences claims to be "scientific", the more ambiguous are his fundamental terms and conceptions. The cause of this paradox is not far to seek. It is usually his way of celebrating his emancipation from philosophy. His jubilation is natural enough: he has found himself free for the first time to discard the more distant problems which intrude on his methodical sifting of detail. But if he stopped to ponder, he might discover that Dominion status is safer than sovereign independence. In dispensing with philosophical criticism, he implicitly elevates his assumptions to the rank of philosophical principles. If they are ambiguous, there is no one to put him right: for it is not his function as a scientist to question them. The result is confusion in the science from the base upwards.

One of the outstanding offenders today in this matter is the psychologist, who is just at the mental age at which it is fun to bait one's parents; and he has to pay for it by seeing his science divided on fundamental issues of philosophy, on which the disputants are unwilling, and in the best circles even unable, to pass an opinion. And in no field is this lack of fundamental criticism, with the consequent uncertainty of purpose, more detrimental than in "social psychology".

¹ A paper read at the Congress of the Association in Sydney University, 25th May, 1936.

There are at least three senses which the term might legitimately bear. (i) In strict accuracy, it ought to mean psychology conducted by a group of people rather than by a single investigator. That it obviously does not mean this only goes to show that practitioners of new and fashionable sciences are not always careful in their use of language. (ii) Assuming that "social" is intended to qualify not "psychology", but the object which it studies, what might be meant is "the psychology of society", i.e., the study of a "social mind", as opposed to "individual mind". As the writer who has appropriated this title for his book denies at some length the existence of a social mind, it is clear that verbal ambiguities flogather in this region; but as another writer might admit a social mind, we have here a second possible interpretation. (iii) Again, taking "society" as an adjective rather than as a substantive, "social psychology" may mean "the study of the minds of individuals as social", or "the study of the reactions of persons to other persons or groups of persons". In this last case the very term "social psychology" comes into question, for although there are some individual reactions which are not social, such as hiding under the bed from a thunderstorm, there are no social reactions which are not those of individuals. The distinction between "social" and "non-social" psychology would fall within the all-inclusive scope of "individual" psychology; and "social psychology", in any sense in which it is opposed to "individual psychology", would simply not exist.

Passing over the first possible interpretation as only verbally acceptable, I propose in this paper first to indicate why the second and third views are not always clearly distinguished: then to analyse their respective implications: and finally to inquire, in the light of these discussions, whether anything distinct and important is described by the words "social psychology", or whether, like so many convenient phrases, they are simply the ornate carving on an empty cupboard. As an attempt to clarify the bases of an empirical study by analysing its confused philosophical presuppositions,

the proposed investigation is essentially philosophical in character.

The distinction of individual from social psychology is based on what is considered the excessively abstract character of individual psychology as commonly studied. The analytic introspectionism which held the field early in the century concentrated attention on the cognitive processes of individuals in their privacy, irrespective of the differences between them or their influence on one another. Its subject was the individual-in-general.¹ It is doubtless permissible for psychologists, as for governments, to put selected individuals into quarantine for special observation; and under the intensive scrutiny of the analytic method many detailed discoveries have been made. But quarantine is not normal life, and the individual isolated for observation is actually in constant reciprocity with his fellows. Whatever the value of analytic introspectionism, there are other and more concrete methods which psychologists may equally well pursue.

When, with the coming of "instinct psychology", attention was diverted from the cognitive to the emotional and conative aspects of human nature, a step appeared to have been taken towards a greater concreteness, for it is by means of action and feeling that individualities impinge on one another. Indeed, the epoch-making statement of the new position by Professor McDougall was actually entitled "An Introduction to Social Psychology". But, as he himself admitted, it was only an introduction, and the abbreviated title, "Social Psychology", foisted on it by the public, while it may owe something to significant confusion as well as to slovenly convenience, was neither intended nor appropriate. The study of emotion and action may be a necessary step towards the study of concrete human nature in its social context, but in itself it is still concerned with sample or typical individual structures. Much is heard of "sex" and "pugnacity", but little of how people fall in love, or what they do in times of

¹ The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of behaviourism.

revolution. It is still "individual psychology", and therefore, paradoxical as it may sound, interested not in the individual as he lives, but in the constituent or recurring factors of his behaviour, stripped of the colour and tang of the special occasion.

Now there is at least one sense in which the procedure objected to is inevitable. However widely the doctors differ on the question, Is psychology a science?, they all agree that it is sufficiently a science to be concerned with uniformities. Like other sciences, it is of course interested in differences, but only as "significant", i.e., as themselves expressive of uniformity. It is no accident that it has been left to biographers and novelists to study the concrete individual as such, nor that people without theoretical interests prefer their work to that of psychologists. Even the psycho-analyst, who is concerned with a specific sequence of mental processes, is interested, in so far as he is a theoretical psychologist, in general laws of behaviour; and his capacity, as a medical man, to help his patients individually depends on a diagnosis conducted in terms of those laws. Perhaps the artist reaches the more intimate understanding; but, as Socrates so often pointed out, insight unaccompanied by the recognition of the reason tells us nothing of the scientific universal, with which, for good or for evil, the psychologist is concerned.¹ It is true that the gap between the individual and the type may be narrowed by a psychology of individual differences; but even these are studied in their uniformity, and inevitably so, or the psychological map would have to be drawn on the same scale as the country.

It is now easier to understand the paradox that "individual psychology" is not concerned with individuals as such. When we speak of *the* individual, we may mean either

¹ As a matter of fact, the novelist and the biographer, in their concrete study of individuals, do not treat them in isolation, as the "individual psychologist" does, but place them in a carefully elaborated social setting. This fact might suggest the Hegalian conclusion that concreteness is to be measured by the fullness of the context. It will be contended in this paper that the context itself is created by personal centres of activity.

the typical or sample individual, which every individual is no matter what else he is, or the unique personal individual, distinguished by his individuality from all other individuals. Many of the difficulties and disappointments attending the study of psychology are due to a confusion between them. They are perhaps best summed up in the following dilemma: either psychology is a science, in which case the uniqueness of personality eludes it; and as the uniqueness of personality is what distinguishes it from the reduplicated forms of individuality on lower levels of creation, psychology is inherently incapable of achieving its end: or psychology is not a science, in which case it will depend, like biography or novel-writing, on a cultivated insight which can seize the uniqueness of the particular, and cannot attain to exact formulæ based on convincing experiment. The simplest escape is to admit that psychology aims at understanding the uniformities of human nature, and, therefore, as an empirical science, has a future, and is not concerned with the essence of individuality in persons, which, alone in nature, is unique rather than generic. But, on any showing, a completely concrete psychology is an impossibility.

This conclusion has an intimate bearing on our central problem, which is to define the scope of "social psychology", for it is in order to overcome the abstractness of individual psychology that it has come into existence. It is a revolt against samples. But if there is nothing in the warehouse except samples, and if it is the special function of the psychologist to handle them, either the revolt is in vain or the psychologist will have to turn into something else: a sociologist, for example. All psychology, as long as it is really psychology, will be "individual psychology", in an abstract and statistical sense.

Here, however, we must note a second approach to the subject. The practical politician has always been concerned with the way in which people behave in groups or masses; and while the swing to "social psychology" early in the century

was undoubtedly influenced on the one hand by dissatisfaction with "individual psychology", it was as undoubtedly reinforced by the general growth of interest in the social sciences. Now, assuming that psychology is concerned not with the unique but with the recurring, may it not profitably employ itself on the recurring features in the behaviour of groups? In so doing, it would not only keep within the bounds of scientific method, but it would do something at least to overcome its abstractness at the same time. The study of groups of men in abstraction is at least less abstract than the study of the individual in abstraction.¹ It is still not fully concrete; if it is asserted, for example, that social imitation follows social prestige, there is abstraction from the widely varying possible centres of social prestige—birth, wealth, religious authority, political supremacy, or the pressure of the average—and, further, each social imitator has other characteristics which fall outside the scope of the generalisation. But there is a difference: the individuals in a sample set of individuals are nearer to life than the sample individual alone.

There is then a form of inquiry, known as social psychology, which deals specifically with men-in-relation, and thus far may be contrasted with individual psychology, which deals with men separately. But how sharp this contrast is depends on the answer to a further problem. Does social psychology treat of men in groups, or of groups of men? This is the question asked at the outset, and the answer will determine the whole approach to the subject. Its importance, however, is not always understood, for in either case the scope of psychology is extended beyond the study of the individual in isolation, and provided this object were achieved, the anti-individualists in psychology were not disposed to quarrel about details. Exactly the same thing happened in the field of social logic, where rebels against the view that society

¹ Because individuals are concrete only in relation to each other, and the study of groups is concerned with relations, though only with types or sets of relations.

is the sum of individuals asserted indifferently, and indeed simultaneously, that it was a system expressing itself in individuals, and that it was composed of individuals expressing themselves in a system. Yet (to return to the psychological problem) whether the distinction between social and individual psychology is absolute, or whether, all psychology being in one sense or another the psychology of individuals, it is relative only, depends on this further distinction which the indiscriminate reaction against individualism overlooked. A common antipathy cannot unite for ever.

The decisive issue is whether there is such a thing as a group mind. If there is not, the impetus towards collective life must derive entirely from individuals. If there is, there will be a new kind of material for psychology to study, and social psychology will have an independent province of its own.

The theory of the group mind is based on an undeniable fact, the fact that people live together. Men are linked in a network of common assumptions: the greater part of what they do and believe is patterned on the actions and beliefs of others: tradition, convention and passing fashion are shared and disseminated, even by those who most protest their originality: a serious departure from the normal is felt even by the rebel at some stage of his career as a painful severance, resembling an amputation: and in relation to other groups each group is felt by its members to be an unit. These are facts to be explained somehow, and the theory of the group mind, if otherwise satisfactory, explains them well enough.

On the other hand, wholeness in a group is not in itself proof of a group mind. For (i) the wholeness may be conceived as a logical articulation, i.e., it may not be a psychological whole at all. Bosanquet, for example, while maintaining that society was an unit, expressly denied that it was a psychological unit.¹ To maintain the hypothesis of a group

¹ *Mind*, Jan., 1921, p. 64. (I owe the reference to Ginsberg, *Psychology of Society*, p. 62.)

mind, it must be shown not merely that there is unity in a group, but that it is of a psychological character. (ii) On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of a social unity of a psychological character which is not a group mind. Unity might be constructed and sustained by the individual initiative of co-operatively contributive persons. Such an unity, while doubtless owing something to the material in which purposes are embodied, would be built directly of the material studied by psychology, but it would not constitute a group mind. The exponent of the group mind has therefore to show both that the unity of the group is psychological, and that it is not simply contributive, but in some sense prior to its parts.

The best known attempt to prove this position is that of Professor McDougall in the introduction to "The Group Mind". As the pages devoted to it contain what must be some of the most baffling tergiversation in the whole history of science, a detailed account of the argument would be merely confusing. What follows is a salvaging and reorganising of some of the main points.¹

(1) The first stage is to contrast "the collective mental life" of the "social aggregate"² with "the sum of the mental lives of its units". Any point which this contrast may possess depends on the applicability of the word "sum" to the relations of individual persons. Actually it has none, except in the avowedly abstract field of social statistics. The mutual influence of persons in relation, with its constant ebb and flow of suggestion and counter-suggestion, with its transpersonal interpenetrations, admitting and even involving a heightening of personal power and independence, cannot be represented by a process of simple addition. To say of anything, therefore, that "it is not the sum of mental lives" is to make a statement without meaning.

¹ *The Group Mind*, pp. 7-20.

² "Aggregate" would seem to be the last word to use in an attempt to stress homogeneity. As remarked above, social psychology is not distinguished by accuracy of expression.

(2) In denying that society is built up out of individuals, it is assumed that the individual is an attenuated statistical emanation. As it is quite clear that no number of such starveling creatures can make a society, it follows that society is super-individual. But the statement is tacitly taken to mean something more. Into the abstract outline of the individual are read his concrete characteristics. Then it implies that individuals as centres of activity within an interpersonal system cannot compose a society. But, at the very least, this conclusion does not follow, as the previous unhelpful conclusion followed, from the very nature of a society. Professor McDougall does not appear to distinguish between the two.

(3) The next step is to affirm, on these general grounds, the existence of a "group mind", i.e., a mind which is not reducible to individual minds or their contributions. It is certainly not easy to gain an impression of how such a mind works; indeed, it is to be suspected that it is an aimless swarm of buzzing contents detached from their respective hives. Perhaps it is some such consideration, as well as a war-time fear of being mistaken for a "German Idealist", which leads Professor McDougall to disown (p. 19) the doctrine of the "collective consciousness". The disclaimer is extremely puzzling, for not only did the arch-German-Idealist, Hegel, carefully avoid psychological terms in his account of the State as a moral unity, but Professor McDougall in other contexts appears to hold the doctrine which he wrongly denounces Germans for holding. Answering a question put to him by Professor MacIver, "does the system will and think and feel and act?" he replies (p. 10) "that it does all of these things". This, however, does not mean that it has a "collective consciousness"; elsewhere we are told that this "complex hypothesis" is one "which it is an offence against the principles of scientific method to invoke . . . before we have exhausted the possibilities of explanation offered by well-known existents and forces" (p. 38).

(4) As it is against nature that a man should thus borrow Occam's razor to cut his own throat, it remains to inquire on what assumptions there can be a group mind without a collective consciousness.

(i) The terms might be used, as by some modern realists, to distinguish "mental acts" from the "knowledge of mental acts". But this is certainly not the distinction intended by Professor McDougall, and in any case it does not help us, as it is in connection with "mental acts" that the problem arises.

(ii) "Mind" may be defined as a general form of organisation, and "consciousness" as its expression in personal form. This is in fact what Professor McDougall does mean, for he proceeds (p. 9) to define mind as "an organised system of mental and purposive forces". Now a well-established group *is* an organised system of mental and purposive forces: therefore it "has" ("is" would be more accurate) a collective mind. This view is extremely "German-Idealist", and it is a mere assumption that a mind in this extended sense can "think and will and feel and act", but it does separate group mind from collective consciousness, and it does leave a distinct and definite sphere for social psychology.

It involves, however, two disputable assumptions. (a) Any whole consisting of mental content is itself mental. This is a pure example of the fallacy of composition. (b) A mind is nothing but a system of contents. This, in the case of an individual agent, is to miss the most distinctive feature. One who can look before and after, and withhold reaction to stimulus while he compares and reflects, is not simply a "system of contents", but, in however small a degree, a source of initiative. As such, he cannot be wholly absorbed into any wider system in which his contents are annexed to the initiative of the whole.

(iii) It would further be possible to maintain group mind without collective consciousness if it could be shown that individual minds are subjected throughout their existence to law, morality, religion, social traditions, and so forth, as

external restraints or limits: these things being super-individual and bringing the individual into a realm in which his decisions count for nothing. This is suggested by Professor McDougall: "a society, when it enjoys a long life and becomes highly organised, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief time in its life." In point of content, this is the best founded of all arguments urged on behalf of the group mind. But (a) it assumes that a mind is merely a matter of arrangement, and this we have found to be untrue. And (b) it proves too much. If law, etc., are just objective facts, standing over against minds and in no way caused by minds, why should they be described as mental? Why, in fact, should we recognise the science dealing with them as a form of psychology? Is it not rather sociology? This was the conclusion drawn by Durkheim, and it seems to be the logical conclusion.

(iv) There is, however, a far simpler way of maintaining a group mind without a collective consciousness, and that is the way followed by Professor McDougall in the body of his text, as opposed to his incriminating introduction. It is to say that the group mind consists of the objectified purposes of group-minded individuals. This conception is free from all the above objections, and it effectively combines the solidarist and the interpersonal views of society. It is possible to hold that Professor McDougall over-estimates the importance of group-mindedness in the lives of individuals: as, for example, when he argues (p. 78) that it is "the principal, if not the sole, factor which raises a man's conduct above the plane of pure egoism". It may even be suspected that his inability to understand the finer and subtler forms of interpersonal obligation leads him to stress the dependence of each on all at the expense of the dependence of each on each: a distortion of emphasis favourable to the conception of the group mind in the cruder and more uncompromising sense. But if this is an error, it is an error concerning the motives of individuals, and not one concerning their nature. It is

tacitly conceded that only individuals have mental processes, and that the sentiment of individuals for the group is the central element in the composition of the group itself. And this means, though Professor McDougall cannot bring himself to say so, that there is no group mind, but only groups of minds, united by the common conviction that their grouping is a matter of importance.¹ If the term is used at all, it can bear only the applied sense in which we say "I have a mind to", where mind is not the subject but the object of the intention.

This analysis indicates that if the independence of social psychology involves the existence of a super-individual psychical entity, it is likely to remain in bondage. The next step would appear to be to demarcate the sphere of social psychology within the bounds of individual psychology. But the right approach to this problem will depend considerably on the solution to another. If there is a super-individual non-psychical social entity, to which all the more complex human experiences are referable, there may be no need for social psychology at all. We must first, then, inquire whether there is such an entity.

The arguments urged on behalf of the group mind have never been stated with greater force or intransigence than by the great French sociologist, Émile Durkheim. He shows the individual embedded in a system mightier and profounder than himself, which stands revealed in the objective authority of law and custom. It stands above the lives of individuals, which are indeed its "substratum", but which it transcends as the individual mind transcends its "substratum", the brain. Its objective sociality is the source of all mental health and happiness in individuals, whom it both permeates and envelops. To this order belong all the most significant features of human

¹ Even in the body of the text, Professor McDougall continues to confuse "group mind" and "groups of minds". The reason (as becomes clear in his discussion of nationality, p. 101) is that he continues to rely on his ambiguous definition of "mind" as an "organised system of mental and purposive forces". (What, by the way, is the word "mental" doing in a definition of "mind"?)

life—morality, law, religion, and even logic¹—everything, in fact, which involves standards, for the only source of standards is the current social practice, enforced by the “normal” on the “abnormal”.² “Everything which is obligatory has its source outside the individual.”³ There is thus a sharp distinction between “représentations individuelles”, which consist, apparently, of simple sensations and desires, and “représentations collectives”, which, issuing from the social order, weld them into a coherent mass of disciplined feeling and action.

It is one of the drawbacks of this theory that it leaves not only no individual initiative, but virtually no individual experience at all. In fact, the logical conclusion is that which is incautiously stated in one of Durkheim’s minor articles: “the soul is the collective consciousness incarnate in the individual, and is thus opposed to the body, which is the basis of our individuality.”⁴ But it is more to our purpose to examine the underlying methodological assumptions. Durkheim’s object is to establish sociology as an objective science. He holds that this cannot be done till it ceases to concern itself with subjective conceptions of “right”, and concentrates attention on positive social facts. As all standards are social, the needs of a scientific sociology are in fortunate harmony with the facts. The whole of experience except private sensations is a mere response to the social structure. The social

¹ On Logic, see *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, pp. 13-18 and also 440.

² The standards of normality may of course change, in accordance with the conditions of existence (*Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 89). Otherwise there would be no accounting for change. Socrates, for example, represents a new culture already raising its head against the old. The change is social, and is not caused by individuals—whose protests merely indicate that it is already coming about.

³ *Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 129.

⁴ This passage is quoted by M. Dominique Parodi, in his *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, p. 143, from an article entitled *Le problème religieux et la dualité de la nature humaine*, in the *Bulletin de la société de philosophie*, March, 1913, p. 74. I have not been able to verify. To judge by the date (Durkheim died in 1914), it represents the maturest phase of his thought.

stands to the psychical as the psychical to the physical; and the explanation of the social in terms of the psychical is only a further example of the false resolution of the complex into the simple, the classical instance of which is materialism.

The interest which this theory has for us lies in its insistence that the social is super-psychical, and can be studied only by sociologists. For if this is so, there is no room for social psychology at all, and the logical result of theories of the group mind turns out to be its replacement by sociology. Psychology, in fact, in all its forms, will stand or fall with the admission of subjective evidence; and social psychology will stand or fall with the admission of inter-subjective evidence. The illuminating feature of Durkheim's treatment is that he recognises it. In this he is both clearer and more revolutionary than the behaviourist, who first, rejecting the subjective evidence, turns psychology into physiology, and then, yielding to what Dr. Watson would call a "religious" (i.e., a vestigial) veneration for antiquated terminology, continues to call it psychology just the same. In Durkheim there are no such gradualistic equivocations. "Sociology sees in social phenomena specific facts, and undertakes to account for them while religiously respecting their specific character."¹ "The causes of social facts must always be looked for in other facts which are also social."² And, finally, "every time a social fact is directly explained by a psychical fact, we can be sure that the explanation is wrong."³

The reply may be made that Durkheim, while rightly describing the relation of the individual to the social, is wrong in describing the social as super-psychical. Surely, it will be said, law and religion, however institutionalised, are sustained, to say the least, by the minds through which they pass. Durkheim, however, has an answer ready. (1) The need for individual substrata is admitted, but the edifice which rises on

¹ *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, May, 1898, p. 302.

² *Règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 126.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

them comes not from them, but from elsewhere. (2) The prejudice that society is produced by individual minds is linked with the assumption that if it is not, it must be governed by material forces. But the objectivity of society is at the opposite pole from the objectivity of the material world: indeed, Durkheim holds that material factors are, properly speaking, outside the scope of sociology. And (3) he clinches his reply by admitting that psychical material enters into the social structure, and adding that it undergoes something like a chemical change "under the influence of the specific forces developed by association", and "turns into something else".¹ On this showing it may even be admitted that individuals make psychical contributions to the social structure, and Durkheim does actually avail himself of this opening, though to do so is doubtfully consistent with the view that all social causation is from institutions to ideas, and that the reverse movement is impossible. In any case, sociology is concerned with psychical material only after its transmutation, and is therefore not a form of psychology, for at that stage psychology cannot touch it.

This conclusion depends on the assumption, which the writer shares with Durkheim, that psychology is always concerned with individual behaviour and depends on subjective as well as objective evidence. It would be possible for another who did not share it to accept Durkheim's analysis and to call the result social psychology. This has actually been done by two of Durkheim's followers, MM. Fauconnet and Mauss, who assert that "sociology and collective psychology are one and the same thing".² It would then follow that social psychology is not concerned with minds but only with institutions. Certainly, if Durkheim is right, there is such a science; but why such a perverse use of terms? Durkheim is much more convincing when he expels psychology from sociology altogether.

¹ *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*, p. 295

² Quoted by M. Parodi, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Durkheim's position, though much more far-reaching and intellectually impressive than Professor McDougall's, fails for the same reason: it tries to cut off social organisation from its dependence on the support of individuals. It has not yet, however, been satisfactorily proved that social phenomena can be completely accounted for in terms of individual contributions. Till that has been done, Durkheim's theory remains a possibility. Meanwhile, however, we can affirm that it is the logical conclusion of all super-individual psychologies of society, and that these psychologies, if consistently worked out, cease to be psychologies altogether.

This being the case, we revert provisionally to a previous suggestion, that the distinction between individual and social psychology is misleading, and that all psychology, including social psychology, is the psychology of individuals. It remains to inquire more closely what *kind* of individual psychology can be called social psychology, and whether it is possible, without going outside the mental processes of individuals, to meet the difficulties which have given rise to the conception of a group mind.

These may be tabulated as follows:

(1) Group life cannot be accounted for in terms of abstract individuals. It is carried on by individuals whose activities are inseparably intertwined, and are united by a mass of common assumptions which they did not originate.

(2) Individual character is formed largely under the influence of habits already prevalent in the social environment. It merely reflects what it finds. Differences of character are due to differences of prevalent habit.

(3) Alternatively, at least in cases of momentary importance, action is precipitated by a wave of emotion which belongs to nobody in particular, and produces immediate unanimity. Here, again, it will be argued, we are confronted with an impersonal social whole.

(4) The use to which an individual purpose is turned in the group structure is often unaffected by the purpose itself.

A man's motive in remaining with a firm which decides to resort to sharp practice is to earn a living for his family. The social effect of this motive is greater power for the shady firm. A man may enlist for active service under a dim but impelling feeling of self-sacrifice. But the state which accepts his offer does not want him to sacrifice himself: it wants him to kill the enemy: and the social effect of what for him initially is an act of self-sacrifice is that the enemy is killed more effectively. Purposes, in fact, become embedded in wider systems of purpose, and are diverted in a different or even contrary direction.

(5) Historical events are frequently such as nobody intended. This fact has given rise to a theory of super-history (called by the Marxians "objective history"), according to which individuals are the instruments of a historical dialectic, and originate either nothing at all, or else simply new grist for the social mill, for which any other grist would have done just as well.

(6) Social attitudes are embodied in material institutions, and cannot therefore be described in terms of individual interaction.

(7) In all these various ways, social homogeneity is a fact, not to be denied in the interests of an *a priori* individualism; and any assertion that it can be explained in terms of individual contributions must be proved up to the hilt.

We may reply as follows:

(1) We have already agreed that society cannot be composed of abstract individuals on the Victorian model. But what has to be denied is the false alternative between an aggregate of abstract individuals on the one hand and a super-individual society on the other. Admitting that individual action is conditioned on every hand, it may still be conditioned by other individual action. Admitting, too, that a society may be homogeneous, why should we not explain the homogeneity as the result of converging or cancelling individual wills? And may there not be centres of initiative

even where the content of the initiated act is mainly conventional?

(2) Individual character is certainly formed under the influence of habit. But (i) what exists now only as custom was once an authentic response to environment; and (ii) a custom which retains its utility is still an authentic response to environment. Custom is therefore the result of the impact of some minds on others, and it only seems mysterious because the initiating minds belong to the dead and the recipient minds to the living. But this is no mystery among a species which, like the human, can convey its experience in words; and there is much to be said for Mr. Chesterton's view that to abolish a tradition is to disfranchise one's grandfathers, even though it may be held that one's grandfathers deserve it. In any case, a customary response is a response of minds. Even in the extreme case of deliberate indoctrination it is minds individually which are indoctrinated; and the question here is not how minds ought to react, but whether it is minds which do react. And the extreme case is far from typical. The spread of custom is due largely to spontaneous imitation, in which the response comes from the imitator without pressure.

As, however, the power of habit has frequently been invoked on behalf of the "social mind", it is perhaps worth noting that its advocates are apt to appeal to it without due discrimination. (i) The word "habit" may cover up the continued usefulness of the original response. There is a persistent need as well as a habit for the wearing of thick clothes by Eskimos. (ii) It may also cover up, with a superficial uniformity, profoundly influential differences of individual temperament. The gentlemanly tradition of modern England, that it is undignified to display emotion, is adopted both by those whom it suits and by those whom it exasperates; but a detailed study of the latter's subsequent reactions might tell us much about the psychology of revolution. (iii) Habits which are externally identical may be differently motivated, and the response which issues in an habitual action may not

itself be habitual. This is noticeable in the case of institutions with a long and varied history, such as the English parliamentary system. New impulses and new thoughts fill out old forms. Thus, in using "habit" as an explanation of social phenomena, care must be taken to allow for authentic responses, and also (though more rarely) for intelligent initiative.

(3) The phenomena of crowd psychology are undeniable, though they reveal humanity at its most irrational, and even if they could only be explained in terms of a group mind, that principle of explanation would not be established for the rest of human behaviour. Actually, however, a minuter analysis reveals a very rapid process of individual infection; and the test case is the stronger or more prepossessed individual who feels in himself the uprush of mass emotion and does not yield to it.

(4) The gathering up of motives into systems of motives, and their consequent change of direction, is undoubtedly a fact, and, in the understanding of what is meant by a social system, it is even a key fact. But it means no more than that some purposes are more widely shared than others, or that some people are in a better position than others to enforce their purposes, or simply that some people do not look far enough ahead. Individual decisions taken under constraint or misapprehension are non the less individual.

(5) It is true, again, that the course of history may not answer to the intentions of any one contributor, and that one epoch is marked off from another by a distinctive cultural atmosphere in which every individual lives and moves as a matter of course. The reason is that there are certain fundamental characteristics of human nature which press persistently for expression, and which cannot all receive it at the same time.¹ This is the psychological truth behind the dialectic theory of history: any historical culture which notably fails to satisfy in a fruitful balance the various funda-

¹ For the same reason as in the life of the individual: because under specific circumstances they may prove to be incompatible.

mental demands of human nature will evolve into another in which the feature previously missing becomes prominent. But it is the pressure of individuals who have individually felt the lack, and not any logical necessity over and above them, which forces on the change. And however fortuitous the result may be from the point of view of any one individual, it is none the less attributable to the interaction, however blind and uncalculating, of individual wills as a whole. On the other hand, if, as some Marxians at least suppose, individual purposes may in a classless society be welded into a single purpose, this can only come about by means of conscious individual initiative, with co-operative effort as its principal aim. In either case individual wills are the primary material of society.

(6) It is also true that material factors, to the extent that they are not subjected to conscious control, must be separately taken into account in reviewing social changes. But this does not affect the point at issue. It means that individual wills are less effectively exercised, but it does not mean that any other will exists. In the same way, the embodiment of purposes in material form may have an immobilising effect, and thus weigh on the side of one set of wills against another. But it does not create a new kind of will.¹

(7) Social homogeneity is certainly a fact, and any theory about it has to be proved. But a fact is not a dogma, and the right theory may be the one which goes behind the appearances. And there is one assumption common to most theories such as we are examining, which seems to be definitely misleading. It is that a contrast may fairly be drawn between *the* individual and society. Thus considered, the individual seems a mere drop in the bucket. But if *all* the individuals are contrasted with society, is there anything left for them to be contrasted with?

¹ It is not disputed at any point that in a "social system" some wills may be constrained. It is merely asserted that what constrains them is other wills.

It is true, however, that it must be shown how individual wills¹ can build up a homogeneous society. We have shown that the arguments urged against the possibility of such a solution are invalid. We have still to examine *how* it is possible.

It is a misfortune for French sociology that the massed erudition and pedagogic pre-eminence of Durkheim has tended to obscure the equal brilliance of his principal rival, Gabriel Tarde. Tarde's hypothesis is that all uniformities in society can be accounted for in terms of imitation, which he traces behind human experience to the universal repetition of nature. The term is widely, and at times ambiguously, employed: memory and habit, for example, are instances of imitation: and so, even more questionably, are respect and intimidation and other attitudes due to the influence of one man on another. But this was merely Tarde's way of denying that society is brought into being by a conscious effort for mutual advantage. Imitation was for him the type of irrational response: what E. A. Ross, in many respects a disciple, preferred to call suggestibility.² And it is doubtful whether these exaggerations seriously affect his social analysis. Even if respect, for example, is not itself a form of imitation, it is very largely a matter of imitation what things are respected. And whatever its difficulties in detail, the hypothesis has the supreme merit of holding fast to the sequence of concrete events. It supplies an account of social similarities which explains their wide diffusion without losing sight of the innumerable individual agencies through which they pass and in which they are reaffirmed. Imitation is a reasonable and much more economical explanation of the phenomena which are said to be expressions of the group mind. It can explain the phenomena of crowd psychology, which will be resolved into a number of simultaneous rapid transmissions of emotion; it can explain the persistence of ancestral habit; it can explain

¹ The word "will" is used, perhaps loosely, to denote a conative attitude, whether conscious and deliberate or not.

² *Social Psychology*, ch. 2.

every form of social homogeneity which is not based on an explicit purpose, and some which are. Even the differences which mark off one set of people from another are imitative in origin; and even counter-suggestion, as Tarde shrewdly perceived, has its origin in an incipient imitation, for the course of behaviour against which the reaction is aimed continues to dominate the mental horizon.¹

It is not, however, possible to assume that the only cause of uniformity is imitation: as may be illustrated in the field of anthropology. There may be empirical evidence to support the theory of Diffusionism; but the mere existence of remarkable cultural parallels in various parts of the world is not enough to prove it. Similar circumstances operating on a basic human nature may produce a similar reaction. Diffusionism may be a true theory, but it cannot be argued *a priori*. Again, the assumption that imitation is the cause of uniformity can sometimes be shown to be bad psychology. When Ross, for example, attributes a working man's ambition to hoist his children to a higher rung on the social ladder to an imitation of middle-class snobbery,² he surely overlooks the intrinsic discomfort of working-class conditions, which naturally inclines those who have suffered from them to wish something better for those whom they love.

This leads to the second factor in the interplay of individuals which helps to explain social homogeneity. Social intercourse results not only in imitation, but in the mutual stimulation of innate tendencies in general. This explains why social unity is not simply based on repetition. Society, in fact, though described for convenience by an abstract noun, is an immensely complex tissue of individual interactions, imitative, coercive, benevolent, hostile, and co-operative (the list is not exclusive), at various levels of explicitness or integration, held together by a variously motivated desire for united action in a body of persons sufficiently large to influence

¹ *Les lois de l'imitation*, esp. ch. 3: "Qu'est-ce qu'une société?"

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 111, 112.

the rest by one means or another. A rational society, one making the most of its resources, would be one built on the reciprocity of free individual contributions. This is the permanent truth in the Hegelian doctrine that society is an unity in difference, though it has been misapplied, and most flagrantly by Hegel himself, because the unity has been conceived as pre-existing, whereas it is only in process of construction. However, the distinction between more and less satisfactory systems of individual reactions is not here in question. It is enough if we have shown that the reactions always *are* individual.

We may now sum up our conclusions:

(1) Society being thus revealed as created and sustained by the intersection of multitudinous individual wills, there can be no social psychology in the sense of the study of a social mind.

(2) As a social being, man is individual, and his sociality (to introduce a phrase of Professor Macmurray's) is adjectival. In the infinite complexity of standardised interpersonal relations, he remains the source of initiative.

(3) Psychology, therefore, is the study of individuals who, through their actions, make up a society. It cannot be based on external description of social facts: it has to take account of all the available evidence, and this includes the subjective evidence. Indeed, if objective means free from personal bias, a study restricted, for reasons of metaphysical prejudice, to external evidence is less objective than one which welcomes all evidence, including trained personal testimony. Subjective evidence, in short, is objectively relevant.

(4) But psychology may either explore the structure of individual behaviour, or the impact of individuals upon each other. In either case it can only deal with constant or repeated factors of behaviour, but in the latter the individual is studied in his social setting, and is therefore more like the individual in ordinary life than is the individual studied in isolation.

(5) Social psychology is therefore the study of individuals in their relations with other individuals, in so far as those relations can be stated in general terms. It recognises, however, that each action falling under its general formulæ is individual and specific. In this sense it is not only a legitimate science, but constitutes the framework for the closer and more restricted investigations of individual psychology in the narrower sense.

It remains to comment on the philosophical character of the investigation. It is the function of the philosopher to ask awkward questions, particularly of those of his colleagues of whose subjects he is not wholly ignorant, concerning the meaning of their assumptions. In view of close curricular associations, the psychologist is peculiarly exposed to his impertinences: and this paper is just another one. But the philosopher has his justification. He finds, often enough, that differences between psychologists are fundamentally metaphysical, and he suspects that this is the cause of their intractable sectarianism.¹ The dispute as to the nature of social unity is a good instance. Up to a point, it depends on specific psychological issues: but when these are pressed, metaphysical presuppositions emerge from the psychological treatment. Psychology and metaphysics, in fact, run into each other; and only a double training will equip the investigator to decide the issue. The fundamental question with which we have wrestled is the claim of *one* possible hypothesis concerning social life to be the *only* possible hypothesis: a claim based on metaphysical assumptions which neither the facts nor a more critical metaphysic will sustain. Our task has been to expose these assumptions, and to show that when they are removed the facts will not carry the case which they have been made to bear, and indeed point more

¹ It is not suggested that results of metaphysical investigation are sectarian. It is metaphysics without investigation which are sectarian: for example, the metaphysics of psychologists. The object of the philosopher in the matter is to examine the merits of the sectional creeds. Even if he cannot decide, he can at least bring the issue into the open.

naturally to a different metaphysical position. This is surely an inquiry in which psychology must have been assisted by philosophy.

In this connection, it should be explained that if in this paper a champion of the much baited mother of the sciences has gently retaliated in kind against her youngest child, it is in no spirit of ill-will. In the first place, his conclusion is one which affords a defence for the psychologist against absorption in sociology, physiology, or an anti-psychological metaphysic. In the second, it is only in so far as philosophical misunderstandings are dissipated that psychology can proceed unencumbered to its goal.

LAW AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON.

L. Petrajitzky's Theory of Law and Morals.¹

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I.

IF one consults any legal text-book on the question, what is jurisprudence, the answer is given in clear and abrupt terms of definition: Jurisprudence is the science of law. Professor K. H. Bailey, in the splendidly chosen subject for his inaugural lecture (17th May, 1929) from the Chair of Jurisprudence in the University of Melbourne—"A Defence of Jurisprudence"—most remarkably summed up the general theoretical significance of jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is the philosophy, the theory, the science of law; law treated as a system, the exposition of the general principles of law, considered as a whole; law treated with reference to the discovery of *general truths* or the operation of *general laws*. "It occupies something of the same position in relation to the several divisions within which the law is studied—property, wrongs, contracts, equity and the rest—as does the subject 'Science of Language and Comparative Philology' to the detailed study of Greek and Latin in the classical school."

¹ *Biographical Note*.—Leo Petrajitzky held the Chair of Philosophy of Law at the Petersburg University for a period of about twenty years, till the Bolshevik revolution. A graduate of the Kiev University, Petrajitzky earned fame in Germany after the publication in 1892 of his book, "Die Fruchtverteilung beim Wechsel des Nutzungsberechtigten", dealing with the problem of distribution of the fruits in the event of a change in the person of the legitimate user. His two volumes in German, "A Doctrine of Income", brought him recognition among the great German jurists of the nineties, and actually caused some alterations in the drafts of the German civil code.

The emphasis laid by Professor Bailey on jurisprudence, as the science of law in general, having as its object the discovery of general truths, represents a great step forward compared with those "classical" definitions of jurisprudence still dominating the field of legal science, especially in the English-speaking countries. The jurist's law, Professor Edward Jenks teaches us in his recently published monograph "The New Jurisprudence", is the law of the state. Even international law cannot find its place in the narrow limits set out by him for the general conception of law, and he shifts it from the field of law to the realms of morality.

Sir John Salmond thinks that the science of jurisprudence is confined to civil law, i.e., to the "law of the state or of the land, the law of lawyers and the law courts".¹ The same definition of law is given by Frederick Pollock, who emphasises the state character of law and compulsion, as its essential element. "The safest definition of law *in the lawyer's sense* appears to be a rule of conduct binding on members of a commonwealth as such."² Obviously the existing dominant school of legal thought represented by such illustrious jurists

His book "Aktienwesen und Speculation" refers to the part played by statute law in shaping the economic conduct in a modern community. His lectures at the Petersburg University, published in Russian under the name "Introduction to the Study of Law and Morals, Principles of an Emotional Psychology", represent a monumental work revolutionising the entire theory of law and morality. Unfortunately this work has not been translated, as yet, into the principal European languages, and therefore the jurisprudence of Petrajitzky can be studied in the Russian original only.

The influence of Petrajitzky on his pupils in the years 1906-1917 cannot be overestimated, as he actually created a school of legal thought of his own. The Russian revolution compelled him to leave the Petersburg University for his native Poland, where he held the Chair of Jurisprudence at the Warsaw University until his death in 1931, at the age of 64.

The influence of Petrajitzky's psychological school of law is manifested in many works of his followers in U.S.S.R. and abroad. Outstanding among his pupils are Prof. G. Gurvitch, author of "Le temps présent et l'idée de l'ordre social" (Paris, 1931), Prof. M. Laserson, now the Dean of the Law School of the Jerusalem University in Palestine, and Prof. Pitirim Sorokin, author of "Contemporary Sociological Theories" (New York and London, 1928) and "Social Mobility" (1927), gratefully dedicated to the name of his great teacher.

¹ *Jurisprudence* (1924), pp. 1, 33.

² Pollock: *Jurisprudence*, Bk. I, p. 29.

of the British Empire as Jenks, Salmond and Pollock is concerned not with law as a science possessing objective logical truth, but with law as a practical profession.

Is it a science? Would any economist consider it for a moment possible to study economics "in the commercial sense", as our jurists refer to law in the lawyer's sense? Law in the professional sense stands to a certain extent in relation to law as a science as economics in the commercial sense stands in relation to economics as a science. As a matter of fact, practical economics, economics of everyday life, is much less conditioned by the "iron" laws of economic value, supply and demand, prices, etc., than professional law by the fundamental principles of legal thought. Nevertheless hardly anyone will dispute the great scientific value of these abstract economic principles even for practical purposes.

At the same time our science of law makes its starting point from a certain branch of positive legal rules which linguistically bears the name "law" without any serious attempt to investigate the true scientific nature of law in its logical objective significance. Since Rudolf Ihering, the father of the dogmatic school of jurisprudence on the Continent in the nineteenth century, the science of law has become enslaved and subservient to purely professional and practical purposes. All natural law concepts were abandoned and rejected as being pure formal speculative ideas, and the entire scientific vision of our juristic scholars did not go beyond the borders of that law which has the sanction of the modern state. No wonder that the great Koenigsberger, Immanuel Kant, ridiculed the jurists of his time who were unable to find an adequate definition for the conception of law.

Kant himself contributed very little towards the solution of our problem. His method of approach was to study not what *law actually is*, but what *law ought to be*. The subject matter of Kant's study of law was not the objective nature of law, but speculative postulates of the aims of law, its ethical significance, as "harmony in liberty".

According to Petrajitzky, such an approach to our problem, which is obviously prompted by the rationalistic concepts of natural law, is still much better than to confine the whole science of law to a small segment of dogmatic-positive jurisprudence. Natural law concepts, in spite of their unscientific, pure rationalistic and partly transcendental character, still served the great purpose of an ideal criterion for the positive rules of state law. Law in the lawyer's sense was enlightened by some ultimate ideal of truth and justice. The positive dogmatic school, which came as a reaction against the school of natural law, denied not only the necessity of some general ideas and ideals in the studies and application of law, but concentrated all its efforts on the "realistic" interpretation of statutes, codes, courts precedents, etc. Law, we have been taught by Ihering and his realistic-utilitarian school, serves to protect the egotistic interests of the members of the community, and under such prevailing ideas of the meaning of law no room was left for higher principles and social ideals of law.

This state of affairs caused a feeling of scepticism and disappointment amongst the juristic scholars on the Continent at the end of the last century. For instance, Bergbohm, in his monumental treatise, "*Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie*" (1892), referred to the absence of a common ground between jurists in their attitude towards the fundamental problems of law. The very conception of law, he says, is in a state of confusion, inconsistency and instability. Merkel in his "*Juristische Encyklopaedie*" refuses to offer a clear definition of the conception of law and substitutes for the latter a description of law. In Russia, Rennenkamp in the eighties of the last century emphasised the failure to bring forward a clear conception of law and, following his German colleagues, he embarked upon a wide description of what law means.

But it is quite obvious that the whole structure of our science falls to the ground if we are unable to solve the problem of what law is, what are its specific characteristics

and its distinctions from other similar processes and events of social life. The elementary law of logical definition—*definitio per genus et differentiam specificam*—is the only one on which a science or a system of human research and knowledge can be based. The question arises, how can we come to a satisfactory solution of the meaning of various species or branches of law, if the genus of law remains concealed from us.

Take, for instance, international law. According to the laws of logic, the conception of international law contains the generic conception of law plus the *specific* distinction of this branch of law. How can we possibly conceive the peculiarity of international law without knowing the true scientific nature of law generally? The same applies to all the other branches of law—state, civil, criminal, church law, etc. Moreover, all the subdivisions of law, for instance the law of property ownership, possession, liability, etc., cannot be understood unless we have a primary, clear, logical understanding of what law in general is.

Leon Petraitzky was one of the first, at the beginning of this century, to challenge the chaotic state in which our science finds itself. He states that no attempt was made to approach the science of law with a true critico-scientific method, that the whole science of law is based on traditions and habitual customary thoughts passing from generation to generation. It is high time to cast away both the speculative method of the natural law school and the dogmatic descriptive method of the positivists and to build instead a realistic science of law. This means in the first place a research into the true nature of the class of events which can be classified as law, and secondly the construction of a systematic theory in accordance with the accepted rule of the science of logic.

II.

Our perception of the *material* world around us is usually achieved through the medium of our sense-organs. But the latter play a secondary part in our perception of the moral world, or, more exactly, events of a spiritual character. We

can "see" joy expressed on the face of our friend or "hear" his grief manifested in weeping and crying, but if we did not have our own inner experience of the feelings of joy and sorrow, our sense-organs, such as the eye or the ear, would be of no help to enable us to sympathise with our friend in his feelings. Such observation of one's own experience is called introspection, introspective or psychological method. It is quite obvious that events of legal and moral nature belong to those human experiences that can be fully perceived not by our sense-organs but by the psychological method of introspection. When we say that Mr. Jones is under moral "obligation" to help his friend, the phenomenon of "obligation" cannot be perceived by looking for it in the realm or surroundings of Mr. Jones. It dwells within the psychology of those human beings who think that Mr. Jones is obliged morally to act in a certain manner. In other words, the moral event of somebody's "obligation" can be investigated and scientifically studied in our own psychic life which is only possible by the method of introspection. Another example: A owes a debt of £100 for arrears in rent to B; A is therefore under a *legal obligation* to pay £100. This legal phenomenon can be perceived when we arrive at the conclusion that it can be traced in one "place" only—in the mind of C, who is convinced of this existing obligation of A towards B.

"Legal events", says Petrajitzky, "belong to those peculiar psychological processes ascribing to various imaginary beings—individuals or classes—certain rights or obligations. This leads to a certain illusion that the debtor of a certain obligation is in a status of being 'bound' by a *vinculum juris*, and the creditor is in a status of some sort of acquisition or possession. In reality the entire right and duty of this *vinculum juris* exists in the psychological sphere of a third person who perceives this legal event in its entirety as a legal relation between A and B—and it is here where the real nature of law must be examined and studied." For instance, if somebody addresses his friend as "my darling", it would be naïve to think that the person to whom this expression is addressed

possesses certain qualities or characteristics covered by this customary manner of addressing our loved ones. The real meaning of this tender and often erotic expression should be sought and examined in the psychological feelings of those who employ the phrase "my darling" to express their inner emotions.

III.

Having thus stated that legal and moral phenomena are pure psychological events—a view far from being strikingly new in itself—Petrajitzky went in search of the scientific nature of these phenomena, the place they occupy in the mental functions of the civilised man. In order to find a satisfactory solution of this problem, Petrajitzky was faced with an insurmountable task. The existing science of psychology, with its tripartite division into the cognitive, sensorial and conative aspects, was evidently unable to explain and embrace in its logical classification those mental processes of the *Homo sapiens* which form the substance of law and morals.

Therefore, a fundamental revision of the entire traditional psychology became imperative. Such a revision required a new method of approach to the problems of scientific classification and to the building up of theoretical concepts in modern anthropological or sociological sciences. Petrajitzky embarked upon this double task with great vision and courage, and the results of his research work have been of great assistance not only to our science of law and morals, but also to various other branches of anthropological science. Petrajitzky examined the orthodox method of definition usually employed by the existing schools of law. This method notoriously proceeds from a certain and inevitably limited amount of observation made in the wide realm of human social behaviour. By a mental process which *a priori* labels certain human actions and relations as legal, moral, conventional, etc., a group of such facts and events is formed and registered under customary names of law, morals, conventions, etc. For

instance, one observes relations arising between a creditor and a debtor out of a loan transaction. Their legal character is taken as granted, and before we have formed a scientific logical concept of the meaning of law we attribute to such human relations the nature of legal relations. It is obviously a *circulus vitiosus*—because in order to arrive at the logical concept of law one starts from social phenomena which are conceived *a priori* as legal phenomena.

Then again, admitting that the facts and events observed by us are by some mysterious intuitive process rightly classified as law, one might still feel sceptical about whether the limited field of our observations represents a sufficient basis to form not only scientific logical concepts, but also theories and doctrines which by their very nature must have a universal significance. One must remember that no theory attains its universal character unless it can be fully and adequately applied to the whole class of objects—concrete or abstract—with which it deals. In other words, every theory must be based not on the limited resources of our physical observations, but on the idea of everything conceivable as possessing certain similar features and characteristics.

Petrajitzky was not the first to observe this logical “*circulus vitiosus*” that became so inherent in our orthodox methods of scientific research. He refers to the eminent German jurist, Bergbohm, who openly admitted that there is no way out of this logical absurdity which cannot be remedied by modern gnoseological inventions. But if this is the case, if this method is the only one left to us by which we can proceed with the building of such an important branch of social science as law, one might as well deny the possibility of having a scientific theory of law at all. No doubt such a step would necessarily lead towards complete scientific scepticism which actually abolishes science in its very substance.

Happily, Petrajitzky did not belong either to the sceptics or to the pessimists. He believed in law as one of the most forceful instruments for moulding the human personality and

shaping our social environment. Consequently a science of law is not only necessary, but it is fully feasible. It requires only a departure from antiquated methods employed in our science and the finding of new ways of approach to the very problem of law, morals, etc.

IV.

Before formulating his own method of forming logical concepts and theories of law and morals, Petrajitzky made a very serious attempt to diagnose the causes of this scientific disease. Is the logical *circulus vitiosus* really at the bottom of this scientific anomaly? In the opinion of Petrajitzky quite another important factor is responsible for the unsatisfactory state of our science. The jurist is subconsciously "enslaved" by the professional use of legal expressions. Although the word "right"¹ has a much wider field of application than in the courts of law and offices of state and municipal administration, although the notions of "right" and "wrong" are employed in many walks of life, beginning from the playground of cricket and football and ending with the code existing amongst the underworld criminals and gangsters, the jurist who formulates his theory of law ignores completely this freely developed life of law. He perceives the phenomena of law through the narrow spectacles of the barrister's chambers or courts of law. The customary labels attached to certain human actions and relations with the inscriptions—law, morals, conventions, religious norms, etc., weigh on the jurist with such a psychological tension that he does not notice how enslaved he is by these professional associations.

It would never enter his mind to question why an agreement of sale and purchase is a legal relationship and an agreement between bridge players setting out certain rules of the game is of a quasi-legal nature. From a scientific point of view, as we shall see later, there is no fundamental difference

¹ I use the expression "right" in its German sense, *Recht*, which is of wider significance than the English word "Law". See Salmond, *Jurisprudence*, p. 9.

between the two agreements. They both belong to the sphere of law, but the jurist deals only with that limited sphere of legal norms which has gained its distinction in the legal profession. These norms have so found their abode from time immemorial in the linguistic usages of legal terms that the jurist takes them for granted without examining their nature from a scientific point of view. Hence a definition of law is formed which is more or less accurate as a *linguistic definition* of the word law or morals, but such a definition is completely valueless as a basis on which a systematic scientific construction can be erected.

In order to form a logical class concept to serve as a medium of knowledge and understanding of a certain branch of human science, there is no necessity either to "hang on" to accustomed linguistic expressions or to make up a catalogue of known facts and events which are labelled as law, or morals, etc. Class (genus, species, etc.) and its logical concept have nothing in common with the *linguistic label* affixed to this class or concept. A logical class concept amounts to the abstract philosophical *idea* of all the objects—past, present and future—possessing certain features, while the objects themselves form a group that is known under the name—class or genus, species, etc. Hence, all objects having any particular distinction, being of white or red colour, being 12 inches wide and 2 inches thick, etc., form from a logical point of view *classes*, and the corresponding ideas *class concepts*. In other words, there is no limit to the formation of logical classes and concepts according to certain observable features.

For instance, about such classes or phenomena as "one shilling cigarettes" or "cats with long tails and short necks", one can make so many theoretical statements and assertions that they would fill up many volumes. About "one shilling cigarettes" one can state that they are subject to the law of gravitation, that they fall down according to such-and-such laws of mechanics, that their size may extend according to

such-and-such laws of physics. It would be, furthermore, possible to make certain statements out of their chemical composition, their biological or botanical characteristics. Endless statements of a true scientific nature could be also made about the class of "cats with long tails and short necks". But while the class of objects, "one shilling cigarettes", is irreproachable from a purely logical point of view, the voluminous scientific statements which could be made about them have no scientific value whatsoever. Such "science" would be nothing but a parody of real science. It would offer us conspicuous examples of how scientific theories ought not to be made.

Their unscientific character consists in their logical inadequacy, says Petrajitzky, in that their logical predicates are referred to the inappropriate—in this case to classes of logical subjects which are too narrow. For instance, the statements of inertia, gravitation and so on in the above-mentioned pseudo-science, are made only about cigarettes and specifically "one shilling cigarettes", while they ought to be applied to all sensible objects, i.e., to an incomparably broader class of phenomena. Such theories, says Petrajitzky, are misleading only because they create the supposition that the characteristics attributed to a class of objects represent only their specific traits, something which belongs only to them, and to nothing else. As there is no limit to the creation of such classes and as the capacity of the human memory is limited, an abundance of such theories would become a greater burden for us than their absence. Petrajitzky rightly named such theories, where the logical predicates refer to too narrow classes of logical subjects, "lame theories". These theories are as unscientific as the theories in which the logical predicate is ascribed to a much larger class of phenomena than that to which it really belongs. Such are, for instance, the statements "All Australians are blonde"; "All Professors are geniuses"; "All Germans are Hitlerites", etc. Such theories are labelled as "jumping theories". The real test of scientific theories consists in their maximum logical adequacy.

Adequate theories, says Petrajitzky, are theories which are free both from the vice of being lame and from that of jumping. In other words, they are theories in which the logical predicates refer not to too narrow or too large a class of logical subjects, but to an *adequate corresponding* class. Adequate theories alone are perfect and efficient theories. The principle of adequacy is the only criterion of a scientifically genuine theory. The essence of the conclusion at which Petrajitzky arrives may be summarised as follows:

1. In order to form a theory of a certain branch of human science such as law, morals, æsthetics, etc., it is absolutely wrong to start from a linguistic definition or from professional usage. These definitions must lead to unscientific statements of a "lame" or "jumping" nature. For instance, all the existing theories of law so far as they represent logical predicates concerning a limited logical subject—*positive state law*—are essentially inadequate theories. Their inadequacy is caused by two fundamental faults. Firstly, they are "enslaved" by certain linguistic associations inherited from time immemorial; secondly, the very method of forming class concepts is based on a mere *enumeratio simplex* of certain observable facts and events, to which *a priori* the feature of law or morals is attributed.

2. It is sufficient to conceive a certain characteristic feature of a class of objects and to prove that such a class (genus, species, etc.) must necessarily possess certain permanent attributes. Thus, an adequate science of law will be created if we free ourselves from the accumulated traditional methods of approaching our subject matter. Neither the positivists Ihering, Laband, Korkunov, etc., who limited their observations to one segment of state law, nor the philosophers who speculated what law ought to be, Kant, Duguit, Kelsen, Pound and others, have contributed essentially to law as a pure science. Petrajitzky thinks that the phenomena of law and morals should be located amongst the variety of our psychological processes. Hence, the whole science of law is transferred from the traditional world of

observation to the inner life of the social being of the "zoon politikon" of Aristotle. But for that purpose Petrajitzky had to embark upon a fundamental revision of traditional psychology and to explore the world of legal and ethical ideas in a new realm of the human soul—in emotions. Petrajitzky was not the first to treat law and ethics as a psychological phenomenon, but there is hardly any doubt that he presented us with the most elaborate and detailed analysis of those psychological emotions which are the starting points of our legal and moral life. He laid the foundation for an adequate theory of motivation, a theory which covers many phenomena which have been ignored by traditional jurisprudence. We shall now pass to the discussion of the psychological theory of Leon Petrajitzky.

V.

Petrajitzky formed his psychological theory of law and ethics not less than twenty-five years ago. Whether by design or accident, he never referred either in his University lectures or in his numerous writings to the English-American school of psychology—W. James, W. McDougall, etc. His criticism was directed mainly against Wundt, Hoeffding and their pupils, whose psychological theories dominated the field of this science at the end of the last century. It is therefore more than a coincidence that the main theory of emotions formulated by Petrajitzky, which lies at the bottom of his psychological theory of law and ethics, resembles so much the theory of emotions expounded by W. McDougall,¹ to which I shall refer later. The chief argument of Petrajitzky consists in the idea that the traditional psychological school with its tripartite division in the cognitive, conative and affective aspects of mental activities, represents an insufficient basis on which a scientific theory of human social behaviour could be constructed. "The traditional and dominating theories of psychology are insufficient", says Petrajitzky, "to build upon them a scientific

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, chapter 9; "Emotion". See also his work *An Introduction to Social Psychology*.

theory of law and ethics. It is therefore imperative in addition to revising the methods of construction of logical concepts to discover those processes of our psychological life from which our 'feelings' or 'emotions' of law and morals emanate." But before doing so, let us analyse briefly the traditional psychological school with its "squeezing" of all the mental processes into the three divisions of cognition, conation and feeling.

By cognition we understand a mental process which enables us to perceive things or objects by virtue of streams of energy affecting our sense organs—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin, and also other vital organs—muscles, tendons, ligaments, joint-surfaces, which play such an important part in our perceptual thinking.¹ Petrajitzky emphasises the passive nature of the mental process of cognition, and here his view coincides with McDougall's similar definition of perceptual thinking: "Our sense organs", says McDougall, "are instruments of selection among the streams of energy playing upon us, a passive selection like that of a sieve which, in virtue of its structure, lets pass the smaller particles and keeps out the larger."

The same passive aspect of psychological experience is ascribed by Petrajitzky to the second fundamental category of mental processes, affection or feeling. Whether there is a positive feeling—enjoying of pleasure or satisfaction—or a negative feeling—suffering of pain or dissatisfaction—the mental experience which we pass through is always marked by a state of complete passivity. As McDougall aptly remarks, the very verb "feel" should be used only in the intransitive sense as when we say, "I feel tired or lazy or hungry", and even here we do better to say, "I am tired, etc."

The third aspect of our mental life is characterised by the psychologists as a state of inner activity. It denotes the striving or conative element of our psychology, our inner urge to act, to complete certain things, to achieve certain

¹ McDougall: *Outline of Psychology*, p. 223.

aims or to preserve a certain order of things. The cognitive element of our mental life furnishes us with images of certain objects, our feelings instinctively react upon these cognisable objects in the form of pleasure or satisfaction, pain or dissatisfaction, the conative or striving power in us wakes in us the urge to act in order to alter the state of things which have evoked our feelings of pleasure or pain.

Such was the state of our psychological science in the first decade of this century when Petrajitzky submitted it to his severe criticism. The modern science of psychology, said Petrajitzky represents a lame science in so far as it claims that cognition, conation, and affection are the three vessels in which all the events of our psychic life are contained. Cognition, conation and affection do not cover our entire mental processes; and therefore the deficiency of this tripartite division is manifested in the fact that this theory accepts *partem pro toto*. On the other side, the separate theories of cognition, conation and affection must inevitably appear as leaping theories in so far as certain mental processes which do not belong to these divisions are artificially "squeezed" into one or another classification. These mental processes are of a wandering nature, and they are placed by one writer in one division, by another writer in another division. They will never find their rightful place in the science of psychology unless we recognise that the traditional tripartite classification does not correspond to our experience and does not therefore explain our mental life in its entirety.

By introspection we can easily detect a number of psychological processes and events which possess features and characteristics of their own. Their biological functions are of such a nature that our science of psychology must find for them a fourth division submitting this new class of mental processes to special study and inquiry. Petrajitzky classifies this fourth group under the name of *impulses* or *emotions*. By *emotions* Petrajitzky understands such varieties of our mental experience as possess simultaneously not only the passive quality of "feelings", but the active impulse to do

something, to act. Our psychological processes are thus divided into two main classes:

1. One-sided mental processes: (a) passive—cognition and affection; (b) active—conation.
2. Double-sided mental processes — impulses or emotions.

The double nature of emotions, their passive-active characteristics have been emphasised by McDougall in his inquiry into the problem of emotions—and here again I find a striking similarity between him and Petrajitzky. According to McDougall, every emotional experience contains a conative factor. "If the conative factor", says McDougall, "could be subtracted from an emotional experience without other change, that experience would be seen to be radically altered. We might still think of the object, and our thinking would still be coloured by the emotional quality. But the whole experience would be profoundly different; it would seem to lack its very essence, to be empty and unreal. We cannot then properly abstract from this conative factor in describing or discussing emotional experience. That impulse to action is an essential feature of emotion, is recognised by common speech and literary usage; as when it is said that anger or fear or disgust makes us do this or that, or impels us to act."¹

The most striking example of emotional experience is shown in the mental processes that accompany hunger-appetite. The traditional science of psychology defines hunger either as a cognitive sensation (Kulpe, Wundt) or as a factor of affection. But hunger-appetite is neither a sensation nor a painful feeling. It is a double-sided process where the passive factor of the "feeling" of hunger is interwoven with an active experience of appetite or craving for food. The same double character of passive-active emotion can be discovered in many similar psychological events, such as thirst, sexual emotion, fear, as a passive emotional quality accompanying the active instinct of escape. Both Petrajitzky and McDougall refer

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

to this double-sided nature of emotion where a close correspondence exists between the passive state of emotional excitement—hunger, thirst, lust, curiosity and disgust—and their active reaction—appetite or striving for food or drink, pairing, inquiry and repulsion.

VI.

Law and ethics belong to the higher emotional qualities of the *Homo sapiens* as a *social man*. But before we define our legal and moral psychological experience in terms of emotional qualities we must refer briefly to a very relevant problem of the motives of our behaviour. The traditional theory of human behaviour ascribes the motives of our actions to our feelings in the form of pleasure or pain. It is our striving for pleasure or for escape from pain that determines our actions and behaviour. The school of psychological hedonism has exercised a tremendous influence both on the Continent and particularly in England, where it was adopted by the founders of the utilitarian philosophy and was regarded as an intrinsic part of utilitarian ethics.

Petrajitzky rejects the hedonistic doctrine of motivation and also here his views coincide remarkably with the theory of the psychologists of the modern English-Scottish school (the hormic theory). But here again Petrajitzky emphasises that the hedonistic doctrine acquired a tremendous impetus in the Darwinian school of development and adaptation, and this doctrine could not be challenged by the science of psychology with its traditional tripartite division of our mental life into the cognitive, affective and conative aspects.

The introduction of the fourth division, emotions, into the classification of our psychic processes helps us to formulate a new anti-hedonistic theory of motivations. Our behaviour is prompted or motivated not by the anticipation of pleasure or pain as the hedonists think, but by impulses urging us to act in a certain direction. There are two classes of emotions or impulses:

1. Emotions where the passive state of bodily and mental adjustment, hunger, thirst, sexual lust, etc., tends to arouse the correlative activity. Hunger motivates appetite with all its physiological consequences. The more intense the feeling of hunger or thirst, the greater is the mental concentration on the ways and means of satisfying it. When a man is hungry and his appetite is attracted by the look of well prepared and served food, his entire being, physiological and psychological, is directed towards the realisation of a specific biological function. We shall name such emotions "special emotions".

2. The emotions of the second group are of a purely abstract nature. In motivating our conduct and urging us to act they do not specify the character and the direction of our actions. For instance, our impulse to obey a command given to us by a superior who is endowed with some power over us does not determine a specific action *physiologically* corresponding to our emotional state of mental and bodily adjustment. We obey the command, to do or not to do certain things, but the character and the direction of our actions are determined by the content of the order in any particular case. There are various types of abstract impulses, which serve as motives for our behaviour. Some of our actions are motivated by our urge to achieve certain aims; some of them have no particular aim. They simply represent a reaction against some happenings in the past. For instance, the atrocities committed during the Civil War in Russia are capable now, after years have passed, of creating or evoking an emotion of anger and fury leading to emotional expressions of indignation and even to more intense actions, such as "coming to blows" with your adversary in the "heat" of an argument.

There are impulses (emotions) which urge us to a certain line of conduct not because we aim at some particular achievements or are driven by some irritating force of indignation, but because we perceive the very character and contents of our actions. In other words, we are attracted to fulfil a certain charitable act, helping a poor man, because it contains the realisation of the charitable instinct in us. This type of

motivation Petrajitzky names self-sustained motivation, as no other factors but the charitable character of the conduct itself determine our impulse to act.

VII.

Impulses of self-sustained motivation play an essential part in those human social actions which are known as moral and legal behaviour.

Let us take an example from everyday happenings and try to examine it with the aid of introspection. You pass in the street a crippled man sitting on the footpath begging for alms. Imagine that this man had been wounded and lost his limbs in the war which evoked your fervent patriotism. Some emotional force drives you to this man, and the least that you feel you must do is to hand over to him your donation. Here the impulse to help is closely associated with your intellectual perception about the man you help, the conditions under which he was injured, and also about the little charitable act you display. The motivation to act is thus abstract and self-sustained in the meaning we discussed for these terms above. Take now another example: You owe your friend a certain sum of money which he lent you under a promissory note which sooner or later you must honour. You did not pay your debt when it fell due and, as often happens, you avoid meeting your friend. But by accident you come across him, say, at a party. No doubt, if you are a man of normal moral psychology you will feel embarrassed or "moved" (emotion) at this unforeseen meeting and this impulse or emotion will motivate your action towards your creditor friend. You will most probably approach him "moved" by an inner sense of obligation, asking, say, for some indulgence. Also here the emotion of obligation which prompted you to act in a certain direction is accompanied by an idea of certain relevant facts closely associated with the emotion itself. It is obvious that in both cases—one of a purely moral character and the other of a legal nature—we conceive the same type of emotion and the same process

of motivation, i.e., an abstract emotion of self-sustained motivation.

I shall discuss later the *differentia specifica* between these two classes of our impulses, but their apparent common origin or genus necessitates classifying them under the one logical class—*emotions of duty or ethical emotions*.

These emotions which can easily be discovered by any one of us by the method of introspection possess certain specific characteristics which distinguish them from other similar emotions. They are imbued first of all with some mysterious authority. They occupy in our mental life a higher authoritative position, directing, commanding and inhibiting many of our other lower impulses. It is most significant that this mysterious factor of our ethical emotions is emphasised not only in folk mythology in the form of various beliefs and superstitions, but also in our common speech. For instance, the word *con-science* both in English and French refers to some other being, *Con-*, influencing our inner actions. In Roget's Thesaurus of English words and phrases, I find that the synonym for conscience is "inward monitor" and "still small voice within". It corresponds in its essential aspects to the moral "Categorical Imperative" of Immanuel Kant, which is the unconditional and absolute command of our conscience.

Other schools of philosophical thought have employed other terms, as "General Will" (Rousseau), Natural Law,¹ etc., but in their absence they have the same metaphysical mysterious character standing above the individual and his passions. From this point of view all the ethical impulses possess a characteristic element of inner restraint. Our ethical conduct represents a set of patterns imposed on us by some "will", no matter whether the will is the "categorical imperative" or "sense of duty" of Kant, the general will of Rousseau, or the set of norms addressed to us by the laws of the State or the conventions of society. But one must remember

¹"Natural Law (*jura naturalia*) which is observed equally in all nations, being established by divine providence." (Justinian.)

that all these moral imperatives binding and directing our social behaviour are not powers beyond us, but within us. Petrajitzky aptly calls them "emotional fancies", as we really imagine that there is some outside "will" or "spirit" whose orders we obey. Law and ethics exist as little beyond our inner psychological experience as beauty in a Rembrandt picture beyond our inherited or acquired sense of æsthetic values.

(To be continued.)

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ÆSTHETICS.¹

By J. A. PASSMORE.

THE existence of any special relationship between æsthetics and psycho-analysis is dependent upon these forms of investigation having a certain community of interest, i.e., on the partial coincidence of their fields. The problem for consideration is to determine the extent of that coincidence.

Although it is generally admitted that æsthetics is especially concerned with beauty, there is no such general agreement concerning the location of beauty and, consequently, the precise sphere of reference of æsthetics. At one time appreciation, at another creation and, though this more rarely, the appreciated object itself, have been considered as the subject of æsthetic judgments. If we maintain that æsthetic characters are qualities of certain processes of appreciation ("beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder"), or of certain processes of creation ("the precious life-blood of a master spirit"), then we have only to recognise that these are mental activities to see the relevance of psychological studies to æsthetics. If, on the other hand, beauty is a character of certain appreciated and created objects, then the relevance of psycho-analysis is less apparent, since, although there are some works of art (literature) which present mental activities, there are others (painting, architecture, music) which, at least at first sight, seem to have non-mental activities (shapes, tones) as their material.

The predominantly Germanic origin of psycho-analysis will explain many inconsistencies which are readily apparent to the reader of psycho-analytic literature. Although psycho-

¹ A paper read at the Congress of the Association in Sydney University, 25th May, 1936.

analysis is founded upon an empirical observation of minds, and although a careful working out of Freud's position would carry with it the rejection of any theory of a simple ego and of the identification of mind and "consciousness", nevertheless we find that its fuller formulations are always definitely influenced by German idealist theories. Especially is this so, because psycho-analysis has emphasised the creative power of mind; and its exponents apparently believed that they found in philosophies of a strongly mentalist character some measure of sympathy and justification for their own insistence on mental operations. Consequently, we find traces of an epistemological idealism oddly mingled with a scientific examination of minds; and these philosophical influences become the stronger as psycho-analysts move further away from their immediate purpose, the curing of mental disorder. In the field of æsthetics, psycho-analysts are naturally attracted to expressionistic theories which regard the work of art as merely a means of communication, an intermediary to the conjunction of two minds, creator and appreciator, the latter being ultimately a re-creator.

With this background in mind, we can see the significance of Freud's characterisation of the artist in his "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (p. 315). "There is", he says, "a path from phantasy back again into reality and that is art. The artist has also an introverted disposition and has not far to go to become neurotic. He is one who is urged on by instinctive needs which are too clamorous; he longs to attain to honour, power, riches, fame and the love of women; but he lacks the power of achieving these gratifications. So, like any other with an unsatisfied longing, he turns away from reality, and transfers all his interest, and all his Libido, too, on to the creation of his wishes in the life of phantasy, from which the way might readily lead back to neurosis. There must be many factors in conjunction to prevent this becoming the whole outcome of his development; it is well known how artists in particular suffer from partial inhibition of their capacities through neurosis. Probably their con-

stitution is endowed with a powerful capacity for sublimation and with a certain flexibility in the repressions determining their conflict. But the way back to reality is found by the artist thus: He is not the only one who has a life of phantasy; the intermediate world of phantasy is sanctioned by general human consent, and every hungry soul looks to it for comfort and consolation. But to those who are not artists the gratification that can be drawn from the springs of phantasy is very limited; their inexorable repressions prevent the enjoyment of all but the meagre day-dreams which can become conscious. A true artist has more at his disposal. First, he knows how to elaborate his day-dreams, so that they lose that personal note which grates upon strange ears and become enjoyable to others; he knows how to modify them sufficiently so that their origin in prohibited sources is not easily detected. Further, he possesses the mysterious ability to mould his particular material until it expresses the ideas of his phantasy faithfully; and he knows how to attach to this reflection of his phantasy-life so strong a stream of pleasure that, for a time at least, the repressions are out-balanced and dispelled by it. When he can do all this, he opens out to others the way back to the comfort and consolation of their own unconscious sources of pleasure, and so reaps their gratitude and admiration; then he has won—through his phantasy—what before he could only win in phantasy: honour, wealth and the love of women.”

On this theory, the work of art is in its essential character a day-dream, fruit of repressed wishes in the artist, and appreciated because others, as well as himself, can find hallucinatory satisfaction from the phantasy erected by his feelings. It differs, we are told, from an ordinary day-dream, but the characters in virtue of which it so differs are nowhere expressly indicated. It is not very helpful to be told that the artist has some “mysterious ability”. It is the elucidation of this problem that Freud has in mind when, in his “Autobiography” (p. 120), he says that psycho-analysis throws no light on the problems which most interest the layman. “It

can do nothing towards elucidating the nature of the artistic gift, nor can it explain the means by which the artist works, artistic technique." The implication of Freud's statement, that æsthetics is especially concerned with the equipment of the artist, his gifts and technique, itself indicates his complete confusion on these questions. The doctrine that beauty is somehow attached to things "as a stream of pleasure" is of an almost incredible psychological *naïveté* in its belief that pleasure is a character of certain objects, and only really amounts to saying that art-works are pleasing where personal phantasies are not, i.e., it only restates and does not solve his problem.

We can, however, say at least that if expressionistic æsthetics is correct, and the beauty of a work of art is constituted by its being the expression of certain minds, then the psycho-analyst has a better chance of developing æsthetic theory than the critic untrained in psychology. He can say much more about the type of mind which creates works of art than can the critic whose psychological stock-in-trade consists of a much-battered associationism and theory of faculties. This will be especially true if we accept the notion of "inspiration", i.e., the belief that art-works are not always consciously planned in advance, but rather appear as the breaking down of inner resistances, and quite commonly as the result of mental debilitation produced by sickness and narcotics. It is quite possible, however, to admit the substantial truth of Freud's main theories, and yet to reject his æsthetic doctrines. Such an argument can only proceed by abandoning expressionism in favour of a positive, realist æsthetics, which asserts that beauty is a character of certain objects, and has as its aim the distinguishing of these beautiful characters.

The logical objection to expressionism is bound up with realist objections to the theory of causality as comprehension. If we deny that origin is character, asserting the occurrence of genuine novelty, then it will no longer be plausible to say that because works of art are created by minds, they must

somehow remain in the mind of their creator. The creation of a work of art is a phase in the artist's history, but this is not to say that the completed work is a phase in his development. It may have characters of which the artist is not in the least aware, and certainly has characters which are not in any sense "his". If we discover, for example, that Leonardo da Vinci was obsessed by certain childhood memories and that his choice of them and, especially, his repeated employment of a certain smile have their origin in this obsession, the æsthetic characters of his work are not affected in the least. However a work of art comes about, whatever its sources and conditions of any kind, literary, sociological or psychological, it has or has not æsthetic characters just as it stands; in exactly the same way as a scientific theory is true or false, quite irrespective of its conditions.

Even in Freud's doctrine, the phantasy has to be distinguished from the forces which give it birth. We can further say that Freud's treatment of the matter, in spite of approaching the question from the wrong angle, does suggest to some degree certain actual characters of the beautiful object. He says, for example, that the artistic work is purged of personal references, and although the purging is not itself part of the art-work, yet Freud is really arguing from certain actual characters of the appreciated object. He has recognised first of all the impersonal and objective character of the art-work, and it is on the basis of this observation that he is led to argue that the artist has purged his phantasies. He has to talk, then, of the phantasies as something distinct from the repressed wishes; and admit, further, that art has characters which we would not expect to find, predicting from the character of the artist's wishes alone. The phantasy appears a discussable thing with qualities of its own, and not as in any sense a mere projection.

From a different angle, we can say that expressionist theories are inadequate, if we admit the commensurability of beautifuls. While expressionist theories have a certain plausibility in regard to literature, where the material consists

principally of human emotions (although even these are often presented in a definite social milieu and as influenced by non-mental conditions), they break down completely where the material is non-human, e.g., in music and sculpture. Yet if beauty is a term with a definite meaning, this meaning must be the same whether the art has feelings, tones or shapes for its material. Admittedly expressionism is attempted in all branches of critical endeavour, e.g., we hear of a cathedral as "expressing the aspirations of the Middle Ages", but such statements rarely have any status and are usually recognised for what they are, mere journalism. In musical criticism, especially, expressionism becomes a muddled mysticism, an attempt to correlate tonal patterns and feelings after the event, and readily appears in its true colours as a statement of reactions and not of content. Here, however, expressionism of a psycho-analytic kind has more plausibility than any other sub-variety. One of the most thoroughly substantiated aspects of psycho-analysis is its revelation of the importance of symbolism in human thought, and the possibility of deriving temporary satisfaction, of an hallucinatory sort, from the contemplation and manipulation of materials which can serve as symbols. If we accept this theory, we have to admit that certain shapes, and perhaps even tones, can have a special significance for feelings.

It is further the case that certain things are more satisfactory as symbols than others, on account of their close resemblance in important particulars to the real objects of repressed wishes—and since these wishes are commonly of a sexual character, objects resembling the sexual organs acquire a special significance for human thought. The psycho-analyst tends to argue that wherever these things are present, they must be present as symbols; but, of course, it is just because they are important to human beings on other grounds and can, therefore, be prominent in thought without exciting suspicions, that they come to be regularly employed as symbols. They exist before they are symbols, and are not intrinsically symbols. Consequently, the argument that our

appreciation of architecture, of columns and enclosed spaces, is really of a sexual character cannot be proved by the mere assertion that these things are often symbols. Even if we admit that men were led to construct buildings of this character on an unconscious analogy with their own bodily organs, it does not follow that their construction was a symbolic manipulation. Certain structures appear in the human anatomy; and their survival is a fair guarantee of their possessing a certain amount of efficiency. If men insisted upon building structures of rooms and columns which fell down as consistently as they were put up, then we should certainly regard their activities with suspicion, but this is not in fact the case. These structures really satisfy certain dominant needs; it is not a question of hallucinatory satisfactions at all. Only the monistic tendencies of certain psychoanalysts, revealed in the insistence on an undifferentiated and unconditioned Libido, can account for their adherence to expressionist theory on this point. In any case, even if works of art are appreciated as symbols, they are symbols because they possess certain characters. They will be appreciated, not because they express feelings, but because they satisfy feelings, i.e., admitting that these things are symbols they are symbols *to* feelings and not merely symbols *of* feelings. And, even on this ground, it is not their character to satisfy, but their characters which satisfy. We have to admit appreciation on any theory and, further, that we would not have anything to do with works of art if we were not interested in them; but nevertheless it is they and their characters which interest us; and consequently their characters are not constituted by our appreciation of them.

Whether, then, we take up Freud's position from the angle of appreciation or creation, we can show that the work of art is not merely a mental manifestation, is not itself mental. Phantasies are different from what produces them and from what appreciates them. It is nevertheless still possible that art is a phantasy; and that beauty is not commensurable, but is merely a special way of referring to the relation between

repressed feelings and the phantasies of others. To see how far this theory is true, we are obliged to examine the nature of beauty; and we discover, I suggest, that the term "works of art" refers to two sorts of things which differ completely in character.

The distinction which will be made is rather similar to the differentiation between "pleasure principle" and "reality principle" which is prominent, in other connections, in Freud's theories. As it stands, the distinction is not satisfactory, because there is no real opposition between discovering the truth and being pleased. Nevertheless, we can distinguish the theoretical attitude from the escape or phantasy attitude, the first being marked by a determination to discover what is the case, no matter what is its nature; the second, by a determination to enjoy what is of a certain nature, whether it is the case or not. Æsthetically, we find on the one hand the revelation of the real structure of human feelings or lines or colours, on the other a distortion of structure and development. On examination, we find that this distortion is the fruit of an irruption of anti-scientific (and therefore anti-æsthetic) demands; and its presence to some degree in most works of art is an indication of the difficulty experienced by the æsthetic attitude in maintaining its position. Of course, it is the work itself which we characterise as æsthetic or non-æsthetic; but the distinction of attitude enables us to understand the existence and popularity of bad art, just as it enables us to understand the existence and popularity of error generally.

Historically, just as we find that out of mythology there has developed religion by a process of increasing secondary elaboration, so out of folk-lore has developed phantasy-art or Romanticism. At all stages this development is opposed by the scientific and æsthetic spirit; for even admitting that science can develop up to a point under the patronage of religious institutions and art remain for a time combined with folk-lore, yet the cleavage is all the while there, the scientific and æsthetic spirit finding itself bound by anti-

scientific compulsions, and showing up, by its presence, the weakness of the romantic and phantasy elements—as, for example, the growth of the artistic spirit in Greece showed up the ridiculousness of the stories of the gods and culminated in driving them out of literature.

There can be little room for doubt that early folk-lore presents primitive wish-fulfilments. The lore of civilisation's childhood resembles the dream of the child in that we can easily discern in it the wishes which underlie the phantasy. On the other hand, a highly developed Romanticism is marked by an increasing sophistication in the use of symbols. Herein enters the note of "mystery" or "glamour", which, we are told, is not susceptible to scientific explanation. Analysis, however, reveals in this "glamour" and incoherence elaborated childhood phantasies. Thus Coleridge's *Kubla Khan* can be revealed as an intra-uterine phantasy, mingled, as is almost invariable in adult phantasies of this kind, with more developed sexual elements. The references to the mysterious land of Xanadu

Where Alph, the sacred river, ran
Through caverns measureless to man
Down to a sunless sea.

And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills
Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree;
And here were forests ancient as the hills,
Enfolding sunny spots of greenery.
But oh! that deep romantic chasm which slanted
Down the green hill athwart a cedarn cover!

And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething,
As if this earth in fast thick pants were breathing,
A mighty fountain momentarily was forced:
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail,
Of chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flail:
And 'mid these dancing rocks at once and ever
It flung up momentarily the sacred river.

reproduce symbolically certain characteristics of the human anatomy with a fidelity which must seem a mere coincidence

to those who have not traced this theme through literature, but appears as a startling confirmation of psycho-analytic theory to those who already have some acquaintance with psycho-analysis. The conclusion

For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise.

then appears in its intimate relationship to the earlier passages, and we can see quite plainly how critics have come to treat this poem as great literature, namely, that it reflects their own repressed aspirations. After all, such symbolisation is often present in literature in a semi-conscious or even entirely conscious form. Much of the exaggerated praise showered on Rabelais and Boccaccio has its origin in this source, the finest example in English literature being Carew's *The Rapture*. Incidentally, Rochester's parody of Quarles, which consisted simply of substituting human for divine names in the original poem, is really a showing up of the fundamentally erotic character of Quarles's hymn, i.e., is a conscious recognition of the symbolic character of the original poem.

We can understand now why Coleridge's poem appeared to him as a dream, because it has almost burst the bonds of censorship, and we can see, too, in his inability to complete the poem after an interruption a reassertion of censorship, manifested in a forgetting of the poem. The researches which have established the position that *Kubla Khan* is a vast mosaic of quotations do not disprove but rather help to establish our position. What would be plagiarism in conscious activity becomes merely a typical character of the dream mechanism, the employment of apparently unrelated material to dramatise the original situation, the activity of repressed feelings.

Close examination, then, reveals a resemblance between a poem like *Kubla Khan* and ordinary "literature of escape". We recognise that the popular novel is bad art; its disguise does not deceive us, we see it as an obvious wish fulfilment and recognise its incoherent development, its inconsistencies and coincidences, as a refusal on the part of these wishes

to accept determinism as a feature of human history and as an essential postulate of art. We may even reach the stage, without any special training, of rejecting the sentimentalism of a Barrie, with his appeal to infantilism, manifest in *Peter Pan*, latent in the enchanted island of *Mary Rose*, but a master Romantic like Coleridge has a power over rhythm and symbol which may deceive us into believing that we are appreciating art in acclaiming his poetry. Æsthetics, then, may be helped by psycho-analysis in tearing away symbolic disguises and appraising scientifically. It may be said that by this process we destroy magic, and this is true, but is nothing against the process. Magic is the arch-enemy of art as it is of science. If we establish a scientific æsthetics, to discover the common characters of the beautiful, we have to destroy all mystery and "higher meanings", but this does not mean that we are destroying art.

The true artist, in fact, is not the dreamer, but the revealer; true brother to the psycho-analyst, not to the patient. He is the fool of Shakespearean drama; concerned only to reveal the true character of those around him, to strip them of sham and convention. He is irresponsible, in the sense that he is not concerned with the results of his exposure; he must taunt Lear on the stormy heath, even where his taunting drives Lear to madness. He must have no loyalties which blind him to the truth; nothing must step between him and his subject. To distinguish him from the pseudo-artist, the Romanticist, we require first to have made the æsthetic distinctions, i.e., the psychological distinctions are dependent upon and do not constitute the æsthetic distinctions. We are led to talk of true artists, and to reject Freud's phantasy theory of artistic endeavour, simply because we find art-works which we cannot characterise as phantasies. Considering the easiest example, literature, we discover beautiful literature to be a complex of human feelings developing through various phases in such a way as to form *one structure*. Similarly the artist seizes upon things and brings out their character as structures of shapes and colours, and the architect develops

masses as a coherent whole. Here, again, we find the operation of phantasy opposed to this development, e.g., we find operations on masses as sexual symbols which disturb their æsthetic arrangements.

The psycho-analytic reply to this argument would be that the "coherent whole" of which we are talking is itself a phantasy, a substitute satisfaction, and it is just in this connection that the recognition of the artist as not merely a creator but a revealer is of such great importance. In the same way, writers like Otto Rank in *The Trauma of Birth* tend to consider all philosophical doctrines as neurotic symptoms, of various degrees of elaboration, where only *false* theories require such explanation. On any other view, psycho-analysis might itself be only a secondary elaboration, and again this view might only be a secondary elaboration, and so on in an infinite regress. We *can* psycho-analyse psycho-analysts, but we only do so if we recognise certain of their conclusions to be false. Consequently, the distinction of truth and falsity is prior to the examination of philosophy as a symptom and, in the same way, the distinction of good and bad art is prior to the treatment of art as a symptom. There is nothing pathological about seeing things as they are.

Accepting this distinction between beautiful and non-beautiful in terms of intrinsic character, we can, first of all, admit that psycho-analytic findings have a distinct controversial value. One main argument against the possibility of æsthetics has taken the form of arguing that there is a distinct difference of opinion on æsthetic matters, but we can now see that this difference of opinion is a consequence of there being two distinct attitudes concealed in the general term "appreciation", the first being the escape attitude, the fruit of that hunger of which Freud speaks, and the second the æsthetic attitude; these two having two distinct objects, both loosely referred to as "works of art" but essentially different in character—phantasy and beauty. Admittedly, then, we cannot say that all works which have at any time been taken as beautiful are possessed of certain positive characters; but this

is nothing against works which *are beautiful* having these characters. Thus here psycho-analysis, as in the criticism of metaphysics and religion, has this importance, that it enables us to see why a certain view is commonly upheld, but this limitation, that it can never of itself determine the truth or falsity of a given theory, the beauty or non-beauty of a work of art. Psycho-analysis, by helping us to give an account of error, has aided progress in all fields, but equally other forms of investigation may help psycho-analysis, e.g., by demonstrating the distinction between hallucination and art, we clarify the issue for psycho-analysis, and make it easier to distinguish symptomatic art-products from genuine artistic objects.

There is, however, a more direct relevance of psycho-analysis to æsthetics in one particular field—literature. Here psycho-analytic considerations can actually help us to determine whether a given work has, or has not, æsthetic characters. This possibility is related to the recognition of the artist as revealer: as one who, with his intimate concern with human beings, has previsioned psycho-analytic conclusions. He has come across strange mental entanglements in himself and others, and has presented them as distinct forms of human activity in his literary work. Thus Baudelaire, in his *Parfum Exotique*, as translated by Arthur Symons, writes:

When with eyes closed as in an opium dream
I breathe the odour of thy passionate breast,
I see in vision hell's infernal stream
And the sunset fires that have no instant's rest.

An idle island where the unnatural scheme
Of Nature is by savourous fruits oppressed,
And where men's bodies are their women's guest
And women's bodies are not what they seem.

Guided by thine odour towards the heat of veils
I see a harbour filled with masts and sails,
Wearied by the sea wind that wearies me,

And in the perfume of the tamarind there clings
I know not what of marvellous luxury
Mixed in my soul with the song the mariner sings.

Superficially, this poem may appear to be an example of that very magic we so unreservedly condemned; but the difference between *Parfum Exotique* and *Kubla Khan* is that here we have a coherent presentation of a particular person's mental processes which, to some extent at least, reveals the true character of certain passionate impulses. The poem is not a distorted presentation of real things, but a real presentation of distorted things. The artist is looking clearly at phantasies, and it is just in so far as he possesses this clarity of insight that Baudelaire is a true artist. On the other hand, Coleridge sees his own phantasies, not as such but as works of art. By failing to realise their context as phantasy-satisfactions of certain definite feelings—a failure evidenced in his presentation of them as a succession of scenes—he makes it impossible for their determinations to appear æsthetically. We have to go outside his works to discover their determinations, they do not appear as phases of a coherent development; whereas Baudelaire's poem is quite independent. We are actually presented with the lover who finds in passion a return into his mother's womb, the real character of the phantasy being remarkably suggested in the lines

Where men's bodies are their women's guest
And women's bodies are not what they seem.

The application of psycho-analysis does not, then, destroy this poem, but enables us to see the intimate relationship of what might at first appear to be disconnected fancies. It does not in itself destroy *Kubla Khan*, the destruction is the work of æsthetics, the discovery that the poem is incoherent; but it does not save *Kubla Khan*, because in that poem the phantasies are not located in a definite person but are simply presented as if they themselves constituted a coherent whole.

Psycho-analytic discussion of literature in this sense, in which psycho-analysis is applied not merely to discover the determinations of a work of art, i.e., the motives which gave it birth, but its actual content, its own characters as a coherent development of a feeling-situation, is commonly rejected on two main grounds, firstly that the artist could

know nothing of Freud's discoveries, and that, therefore, they are not relevant to the criticism of his work, and secondly that they quite wrongly treat literary characters as human beings. Thus, it is argued, Ernest Jones's analysis of Hamlet ("Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis") may be a brilliant essay in speculation, but has no real relevance to the critical issues; because to treat Hamlet as a victim of the Œdipus complex is to neglect the simple fact that Shakespeare had never heard of such a thing, and involves, further, the absurd conclusion that we have to talk about the childhood fixations of a man who never had a childhood, his life being bounded by the confines of Shakespeare's drama.

The latter argument, however, would destroy the very possibility of literary criticism. In all such criticism we are bound to treat the characters as human beings, determined in the same way as any other human being. We recognise, for example, that certain characteristics are inconsistent with one another, i.e., cannot exist together in the one human being; and, further, that from a certain initial situation, a conflict of characters, certain developments cannot possibly follow. We reject as unæsthetic sudden and unexplained conversions and reconciliations. We are enabled to do this, not on the basis of any *a priori* and formal knowledge of the laws of development, but simply on the basis of our knowledge of human beings. This does not imply the acceptance of "naturalism"; the fact that "things sometimes happen that way", e.g., that problems are resolved by a sudden inheritance, does not justify the use of these means in literature. What we require is a solution of the problems suggested by certain initial possibilities, the juxtaposition of certain minds and the resolution of their interaction, but nevertheless we are dealing all the while with the characters of minds, as we know them, in historical circumstances, as we know them.

The critic who has some acquaintance with psycho-analytic doctrines has more intimate appreciation of human possibilities than can ever be derived from cursory contacts with his own immediate circle. He is in a better position,

then, to understand what lines of development are possible, what human characteristics are consistent; and his new knowledge may enable him to discover that an apparently incoherent work exhibits a precise and definite theme.

To say that such criticism could only have relevance where the artist himself was acquainted with psycho-analysis misses the fundamental significance of these new discoveries, unless it is argued, a view we have given reasons for opposing, that æsthetic appreciation is simply an appreciation of the artist's "consciousness". It is as if to say that there were no neurotics until Freud developed his theories. The artist came across neurotic characters in the course of his ordinary life-history, and frequently seems to have discerned something of the true significance of their symptoms. Hazlitt in his essay, "On Dreams", explicitly anticipates Freud's theories in saying that "we may sometimes discover our tacit, and almost unconscious, sentiments with regard to persons and things" in our dreams, and that "when awake, we check these rising thoughts and fancy we have them not"; but even where the matter has not been expressly presented, it is sometimes evident that the artist has observed the importance of activities commonly regarded as completely trivial. Thus Sterne, in *Tristram Shandy* makes much of small gestures as symptomatic actions in the manner of Freud's *Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life*; and in Tchekov's *The Darling*, to take only one example, we find dreams presented as an integral part of the mental life of the characters. He is depicting a woman of an essentially dependent nature, whose every action faithfully echoes the predominant interests of the men who pass through her life. Wedded to a timber-merchant, she dreams: "She dreamed that a whole regiment of six-inch beams, forty feet high, standing on end, were marching upon the timber-yard; that logs, beams and boards knocked together with the resounding crash of dry wood, kept falling and getting up again, piling themselves upon one another", while later, her lovers departed, disconsolately "she went to bed and dreamed of her empty yard". These dreams appear as an integral part of the main

theme, are emphasised in a way which suggests that Tchegov has somehow divined their important sexual significance and their intimate relation to his central theme. It is extraordinary how closely they resemble the dreams recorded in psycho-analytic case-histories, and, incidentally, they help to dispel the suggestion that such dreams are produced by some species of auto-suggestion. We lag behind the artist and, although we might unconsciously recognise something of their significance, the dreams must appear to us, æsthetically, as irrelevancies unless we understand, through psycho-analysis, their latent significance.

Considering Jones's analysis of *Hamlet*, it appears that although the suggestion that Shakespeare himself was a victim of the Œdipus complex is only of incidental æsthetic importance, the theory that Hamlet's delay in consummating his revenge is born of his repressed desires, whether it is true or not, is at any rate of direct relevance. Shakespeare's own difficulties might explain his choice of theme and the weaknesses in its presentation; but the interpretation of Hamlet's character is of basic importance in understanding the whole play. Shakespeare had never heard of the Œdipus complex, but Tchegov had never heard of symbolisation or dramatisation and yet can present dreams which are clearly dramatised symbolisations of desires. To argue that we are unduly sophisticating what is essentially an Elizabethan revenge-play would amount to saying that *Hamlet* is nothing but a hotch-potch of crude melodrama and superstition which has somehow imposed its sway over the centuries. Such a view neglects entirely the great "rationalising" soliloquies, sometimes on the ground that they were commonly omitted in the acting versions. It is, however, just these soliloquies which raise *Hamlet* above the level of the folk-phantasy on which it is founded. They are, in effect, an attempt to come to grips with the fascinating but intractable material on which Shakespeare was working. Shakespeare found in the revenge-play, with its concealed Œdipus theme, a difficult human problem; and *Hamlet* is a great play just in so far as

this problem is realised and presented. Enterprising theatre-managers, of course, were interested only in "popular appeal", and this was more readily available in the phantasy than the revelation form, so that we find the play unmercifully mutilated. In the written play, however, and it is in this form that Shakespeare saw it in creating it, we find a continual emphasis on delay as the central problem, on Hamlet's inhibition against killing Claudius, which is not an opposition to killing in general. It is not the business of the artist to cure, but to present; and it is just in so far as Shakespeare has traced the development of certain symptoms through their various phases, that *Hamlet* is a work of art. What the psycho-analyst can do is to show that Hamlet's behaviour is consistent; and that his activities are phases in the history of a developing mind.

Summarising our conclusions, we have seen that in so far as psycho-analytic theories of art are expressionistic, i.e., regard beauty as a constitutive relation, they are illogical and cannot provide a satisfactory account of æsthetic characters. Their conclusions, admitting the truth of psycho-analysis, can only be finally refuted by the establishment of a positive æsthetics and the recognition of the artist as revealer. We can then see that they have their basis in the common confusion between the romantic and the beautiful. Having distinguished the romantic as phantasy from the beautiful as revealed, the æsthetic quality of the latter consisting in the character of its structure, we see that psycho-analysis may aid the critic in estimating the coherence of a work of art, and in this way be of direct, as distinct from controversial, assistance to critical theory.

DETERMINISM AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS.

By ANTHONY M. MARDIROS.

IN the following pages I shall be concerned not so much in proving the validity of the determinist position, the evidence for which I regard as conclusive, but in attempting to analyse the main points at issue between determinism and free will and deducing the ethical consequences which follow from such an analysis.

The determinist asserts that any event is the result of antecedent conditions or causes, and that from a given cause or set of conditions only one consequence can follow. A variation in the consequence would mean that there had been a variation in the antecedent conditions and *vice versa*. Applied to human conduct this means that there are no 'uncaused' actions, that human conduct is the result of antecedent conditions bringing about a certain external state of affairs and a certain type of human nature which reacts to this state of affairs in a definite way.

The free will theorists assert that persons have the power of choosing out of possible alternative lines of action and that therefore the universe does not consist of a fixed and irrevocable series of events. They declare that Thomson was wrong when he said:

If one is born a certain day on earth
All times and forces tended to that birth,
Not all the world could change or hinder it.

For instance, one's parents may have chosen not to marry, and one would not then have been an occurrence in the history of the universe. Now it has been claimed that these two positions are not fundamentally opposed, that one may believe in free will without being an indeterminist, and that although all actions are caused, this does not prevent choice being a reality.

Thus we see that the problem hinges on what we mean by choice. Even among those who oppose determinism to free will there is some confusion about the term choice. Bertrand Russell denies free will, but goes on to say that we hold a man responsible for his actions if he chooses the worse of two possible alternatives that occurred to him.¹ Surely this is rejecting free will at the front door and letting it in at the back door. If there were genuine alternatives for *that man*, then he has free will.

The determinist, however, asserts that when we say a man has a choice we mean that the external conditions of the situation allow of several possible alternatives, and that from the point of view of an outside observer any of them may be the action performed. But when we consider the nature of the man, his character, disposition, past history and present frame of mind, it is apparent that only one course of action is possible for him. If we imagine him acting differently, then we are imagining a different man, for, according to the determinist principle, a different result means a different cause. When we assert that it was possible for a man to act otherwise than he actually did, what we have in mind is man in general and not a particular man. Given a man in a particular situation, if we know nothing of him we can no doubt think of a large number of probable actions which he may do; but if we know him this number will be narrowed, and the more intimately we know him, the fewer becomes the number of alternatives that we regard as likely. Since there are obvious limits to our knowledge of other people and even of ourselves, we can rarely be absolutely certain what the actual conduct will be. On the other hand, we can tell with certainty what a chemical substance will do under certain conditions. The difference is not one of principle but only of complexity. We know all the relevant facts about the chemical substance, but we never do about a particular man, hence our ignorance increases the number

¹ *Philosophical Essays*: essay on "The Elements of Ethics".

of possibilities, and we can only predict within wide limits. In the limerick concerning

The young man who said: "Damn!
To think that I am what I am,
A creature that moves,
In predestinate grooves,
Not even a bus but a tram."

the writer perhaps intended to indicate the apparent difference in principle between the stereotyped reactions of what is called inanimate nature and the varied behaviour of men, and hence to draw a conclusion in favour of free will theories. The limerick, however, really affords an excellent illustration of the determinist principle.

The determinist would say that man is comparable not with the tram but with the bus, since he has more complex and varied reactions than occur in other spheres of nature, but he is none the less absolutely determined. Anyone can predict the course of the tram, for (excluding accidents) its nature is such that it can go only one way. But a bus is so constructed that no one would venture to predict precisely what course it would take to its destination, this being largely dependent upon the obstructions that it meets with. Nevertheless, the bus is just as much determined as the tram, since it will meet with certain obstructions which will cause it to take a certain definite route rather than another. The inability to predict the actions of anything can afford no ground for asserting freedom of choice, otherwise the more intimately we know the characters of our friends, the less free they become, which is absurd. To sum up, the determinist asserts that when we declare that a person exercises choice we are merely saying that his nature forms part of the whole set of conditions which determines his actions. It is quite as intelligible to say that a cork chooses to float or that a stone chooses to sink. Furthermore, when we claim that there are alternative possibilities in the universe which a person may choose from, we are either talking of an individual in terms of the wide class to which he belongs, or looking only at some

of the conditions and ignoring others, or we are crediting with objective validity the subjective uncertainty of our knowledge. Since, as I have shown above, free will depends upon the reality of choice between genuine alternatives, it is definitely incompatible with determinism. Therefore, to the extent that one believes men's actions to be the product of free will, to that extent one is an indeterminist.

Since determinism cannot be reconciled with free will, many people will then object that determinism is fatal to all morality. If determinism were true, they say, then it is useless for us to strive, to decide, or think about anything. A legitimate argument can be put forward by the determinist to the effect that this argument itself presupposes free will, since it assumes that it is in our power *not* to strive, think or decide; but from the determinist point of view we do these things because we must, because it is our nature to do so.

There is, however, a more profitable line of argument since it serves to make the determinist position clearer. The objection given above confuses determinism with what I shall call fatalism. The latter is common among eastern peoples, but is also prevalent among the superstitious of all countries (those who seek the assistance of fortune-tellers, astrologers, etc.). It is based not on scientific or logical reasons, but on emotional prejudices and belief in the supernatural. Though it is rarely explicitly stated and is often inconsistent with other views held by the same person, it implies that it is the important events of our lives that are predetermined by fate (or God, or the stars), and that within these limits we have freedom of action, though it is insignificant. The woman on the sinking ship refuses to enter the lifeboat for she knows that fate has decreed that she will be drowned, and she does not wish to involve others in her misfortune. Notice that she is free to stay on the ship or go in the lifeboat; it is only the manner and time of her death that is determined.

Now this type of determinism is obviously nonsense, and it is this type only against which the objection of futility is

effective, for it recognises only external causes and imagines the individual free within limits, but ineffectively so. The type of determinism which we are concerned with here allows for the importance of motives, thoughts, decisions, aims, etc., but insists that it is largely through these that we are determined according to the principle of cause and effect. The chain of events may determine that tomorrow I shall narrowly escape being run over by a careless motorist. My escape depends upon whether or not I use my presence of mind and am alert in leaping out of the way, and it is just this internal condition (as well as the external conditions) which is determined. The communist may believe that the class war is inevitably determined, but he also recognises that if this is so it will only be, amongst other things, because of the efforts of himself and his comrades. Thus determinism does not make human effort appear futile, since it is part of the causal chain.

On the other hand, to the extent that men's conduct is the product of free will, certain types of action become futile. What is the use of providing children with moral training and education if their actions are the result of something spontaneous and unconnected with the past?

But the moralist may object, if all our actions are determined, and we cannot therefore freely choose between types of actions, then there is no such thing as responsibility, and this is destructive of all morality. How can there be morality if we are not free to choose between right and wrong? The determinist answer to this is that to found morality on the idea of responsibility is to build on shifting sands. I contend that the conception of moral freedom is not necessary to account for morality. A moral person may be defined as one who does actions conducive to good from a right motive, or more simply as one who acts rationally. It does not matter in the least from this point of view how a man comes to have good motives or how he comes to act morally; all that matters is that he *does* act morally.

What effect has this on praise and blame? Can we apply these to people when we know that strictly speaking they are not responsible for their actions, but must act as they do? As a matter of fact, people do praise others for their beauty, their intelligence or their physical perfection, and they never think of regarding them as responsible for these things. Similarly dislike is expressed for ugliness, stupidity and physical defect in people.

Now there is still more reason for applying praise and blame to the moral qualities of people than to the qualities above mentioned. Praise or blame cannot change ugly people to beautiful people, or stupid people to clever people, or weaklings to athletes, but at certain stages of moral development praise and blame are determining causes in inducing right conduct and in building up a moral character. People cling to the notion of free will because they think that without it there is no justification for feeling angry and vindictive against those who wrong them. Firstly, I would point out that people feel anger against animals and yet these are not commonly credited with free will. Secondly, I would agree that there is no justification for vindictive action against those who wrong us. You may, of course, feel disgusted, repelled or indignant about a certain action, and it is difficult to dissociate such feelings from feelings of anger against the person concerned, but determinism declares that there is no justification for vindictive feelings against wrong doers.

How does this affect the punishment of misdeeds? Punishment is justifiable in so far as it is a determining cause which deters people from wrongdoing or reforms them, otherwise there can be no rational reason for punishing people. The function of punishment is to influence the future actions of the wrongdoer or to act as a deterring influence on those similarly minded. In courts of law the question frequently arises as to whether or not the accused is responsible for his actions. The question usually resolves itself into a futile

discussion as to the border-line between sanity and insanity, and as to whether the accused could be termed insane. Deterministic principles at once make the situation clear. From the point of view of responsibility there is no difference between the madman and any other human being, since all are equally determined, so the question for the law to decide is: what action can we take to reform or deter this man from repeating his undesirable behaviour? Will punishment act as a deterrent to potential criminals of the same type?

Although we have denied responsibility in the sense in which that word is usually used, yet from the determinist point of view we can still assign an act to an individual's character, and say, "Your nature is such that you do certain acts which are undesirable", and we can then attempt to influence and redirect that nature by education, praise and blame or reward and punishment. On the other hand, if free will exists, then at any moment an action may spontaneously issue from a person, being uncaused and having no relation to his past nature and character. In that case, how can we influence him in any way? How can we judge his character when in spite of his actions in the past we never know how he will act next? If one could choose indifferently without reference to what has been done in the past and to the motives or tendencies present at the moment of choice, one could hardly be held *responsible* for the results, for one could then claim with justice that the deed after it is done is not one's very own, but only the product of the arbitrary will or choice of the moment. If I am to be held responsible for a deed the deed must be mine. But how could a deed be mine now, if it was done in the past and was at the time the product of an arbitrary choice, and might I not now choose the exact opposite if it were to be done over again? Thus responsibility in any sense whatever is incompatible with free will. Determinism alone offers a basis upon which to rest an intelligible justification of moral censure or praise. The determinist rejection of responsibility, however, is definitely incompatible with certain religious views concerning an after-

life in which persons are rewarded or punished according to their conduct and beliefs in this life. The determinist asserts that since we are parts of a determined universe which makes us what we are, any being who held us responsible for our conduct would be both irrational and immoral.

Closely connected with the theory of responsibility just criticised is the notion of obligation. We feel that we ought to do one action rather than another, and we are constantly asserting that some actions ought not to be done. The free will theorist insists that unless we have an undetermined choice out of a number of possible actions there is no sense in saying that we ought to act in a certain way, since, according to the determinist, there is only one way in which we can act. The determinist's reply, however, is that "you ought to act in a certain way" means "*if* you are to achieve certain ends you *must* act in this way". In every statement containing 'ought' or asserting obligation there is a hidden hypothetical, and this must be so for the word 'ought' implies necessity. Assuming that we have free will, what is meant by saying, "You *ought* to love your neighbour"? It cannot mean that you have no other course open to you than to love your neighbour, for having free will we may declare that we have no intention of loving our neighbour. The person who lays down the obligation can only reply in such terms as, "You must do this *if* you are to live a moral life." Therefore, no matter what theory you hold concerning the cause of human actions, obligation can only be truly expressed in a hypothetical form. Now such expression is quite compatible with deterministic principles and therefore obligation is not an argument in favour of free will.

In conclusion, I assert that determinism is in no way incompatible with a rational ethic, and that deterministic principles so far from being subversive of morals, provide the only sound basis upon which they can be built.

On the other hand, determinism runs counter to some of the most cherished beliefs of religions, and my conclusion is—so much the worse for religion.

REVIEW.

SCIENCE AND THE SPIRIT OF MAN. By Julius W. Friend and James Feibleman. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1933. Pp. 336. 12s. 6d. net.

Once again, in "Science and the Spirit of Man", the philosophical amateur sets out to solve all the world's most pressing problems with a single formula. In this case the formula asserts that "something fallacious must be involved whenever a theory comes into conflict with the most basic human needs, or insults human dignity; since the very terms by which any theory must be stated are those which attain meaning only through the fundamental appetition of humanity, the impulse toward integration with all else, which is infinity" (p. 190). With this touchstone, the authors cheerfully set out to construct a new metaphysics, a new world-order, a new physics, a new psychology and a renewed world of values. As an example of their procedure, one need only mention that Behaviourism, Classical Psychology, Gestalt Psychology and Psycho-analysis are all refuted within thirteen pages.

An almost incredibly naive book, alternating between a cavalier treatment of the main philosophical problems and a prolix treatment of the commonplace.

J.A.P.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND: A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 16s.

Vol. XLV. No. 177, January, 1936. Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature (II): M. B. Foster. Is the Self a Substance?: I. Gallie. Stout on Universals: Helen Knight. No. 178, April. Utilitarianism Revised: R. F. Harrod. The Meaning of Implication: Daniel J. Bronstein. Introspection, Mental Acts, and Sensa: C. J. Ducasse.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Published fortnightly. Columbia University, New York. Subscription: \$4 a year.

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Vol. XI. No. 41, January, 1936. New Science and Old Philosophy: Sir Herbert Samuel. The Æsthetical Significance of the Tragic: The Earl of Listowel. Great Thinkers—(VII) Malebranche: John

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Vol. XXV. No. 97, July, 1935. Contribution à l'étude de l'intelligence pratique chez l'enfant: Marc Lambercier et André Rey. Esquisse biologique et psychologique de l'évolution: J. Kollartis. La test de barrage: Bienvenue Bugnion. Faut-il mesurer la qualité ou la quantité: Richard Melli.

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Vol. XVII. Part 1, January, 1936. A Note on Suicide: Melitta Schmideberg. Purposive Accidents as an Expression of Self-destructive Tendencies: Karl A. Menninger. Infantile Ideals: M. N. Searl. Dominant Ideals and their Relation to Morbid Cravings: Therese Benedek. The Psychology of the Festival of Christmas: Ludwig

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Vol. III. No. 4, 1936. Ueber die Transformation des Bewusstseins: M. Abe. Ueber das Gedächtnis für lust- und unlust-betonte Erlebnisse im Alltagsleben (II): T. Susukita. An experimental study of the consciousness of tonality—(II) On minor tonality: M. Aizawa.

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Vol. XV. No. 4, October-December, 1935. L'information (compte rendu de la XVIIe Semaine Sociale Universitaire de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay): Paul M.-G. Levy. L'idéologie du corporatisme: Georges de Leneer. Vol. XVI. No. 1, January-March, 1936. La Société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions: Alexandre Eck. La féodalité en Egypte: Jacques Pirenne. La régime féodal au Japon: André Gonthier. Les liens de vassalité dans la France médiévale: Olivier Martin. Les liens de vassalité et les immunités en Espagne: Luis G. de Valdeavellano. La féodalité musulmane: Paul Wittek. La vassalité et les immunités dans la Russie du moyen âge: Alexandre Eck. Les journaliers agricoles en Italie et la politique rurale du Gouvernement fasciste: G. Jacquemyns.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. XIII. No. 1, November, 1935. The Restatement of the Law of Torts: Percy H. Winfield. Unemployment Insurance in the State of New York: Herman Arnold Gray. The Doctrine of Quasi-

Territoriality of Vessels and the Admiralty Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed on board National Vessels in Foreign Ports: Alexander N. Sack. No. 2, January, 1936. **The Schechter Case—Landmark or What?:** E. S. Corwin. **Trusts and Suspension of the Power of Alienation in New York:** Ralph E. Kharas. **The Interpretation of the Covenant in the Sino-Japanese Dispute:** Mirosław Gonsiorowski. No. 3, March. **On Looking into Mr. Beale's Conflict of Laws:** Frederick J. de Sloovere. **Attachment of Choses in Action in New York:** Mark H. Johnson. **Hybrid Securities—A Study of Securities which Combine Characteristics of Both Stocks and Bonds:** J. W. Hansen.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu. Annual subscription: \$2.

Vol. VIII. No. 4, December, 1935. **The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway:** A. J. Kantorovich. **Man-made Deserts:** W. C. Lowdermilk. **Indian Minorities under the American New Deal:** Elizabeth Green. **The New Philippine Constitution:** Conrado Benitez. **Cross-Currents in the Chinese Theater:** George Kin Leung. **The Legal Foundation of the Stimson Doctrine:** Quincy Wright. Vol. IX. No. 1, March, 1936. **The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Crisis in the Far East:** Sir Frederick Whyte. **Mongolia—Target or Screen:** Victor A. Yakhontoff. **The Social Basis of Fascism:** Joseph Barnes. **The Commonwealth of the Philippines:** Ifor B. Powell. **Reform and Politics in Canada:** H. Carl Goldenberg. **The Nemesis of National Planning:** H. V. Hodson.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. XI. No. 21, December, 1935. **The Incidence of a Progressive Land Tax:** J. M. Garland. **A Policy for a New Zealand Reserve Bank:** A. G. B. Fisher. **Some Economic Effects of a Stationary Population:** G. C. Billing. **Australian Export Prices, 1880-1935:** Willmott Phillips. **Public Works as a Recovery Measure:** E. R. Walker. **The Transport Problem in Victoria:** L. Goldberg. **Social Legislation in New Zealand—A Comparison:** E. P. Haslam. **The Valuation of Australian Wheat for Commercial Purposes:** G. L. Sutton. **Wages Policy in the Depression:** A. Smithies.

THE HUMAN FACTOR. Published monthly by the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. IX. No. 11, November, 1935. **Social Relationships in the Factory—a Study of an Industrial Group:** T. North Whitehead. **The Present Position of Selection Tests:** L. S. Hearnshaw. **A Farmer's Experience in the Application of Industrial Psychology:** Frank Clarke. No. 12, December. **Annual Report.** Vol. X. No. 1, January, 1936.

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THE AUSTRALIAN INTERCOLLEGIAN. Published monthly by the Australian Student Christian Movement, 182 Collins Street, Melbourne.

NOTES AND NEWS.

CONGRESS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

IN connection with the Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, a Congress was held in Sydney University on Monday, 25th, and Tuesday, 26th May, 1936. In addition to Professor H. Tasman Lovell's Presidential Address on "Dreams", papers were read by Professor A. Boyce Gibson on "Social Psychology", Mr. J. A. Passmore on "Psycho-Analysis and Æsthetics" (these two papers appear in this issue of the Journal), Professor John Anderson on "Scientific Method", Mr. W. M. O'Neil on "The Status of Instinct", and Mr. P. H. Partridge on "The Social Theory of Truth". The meetings were well attended, and the papers provoked some quite animated discussion. The attendance of as many as six visitors from Melbourne was gratifying, and their expressed wish that a Congress might be held each year, instead of biennially as at present, is worthy of serious consideration.

MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY.
(Affiliated with the Australasian Association of Psychology and
Philosophy.)

THE Society's office-bearers for 1936 are as follows:

President: Professor A. Boyce Gibson.

Vice-Presidents: Mr. W. M. Ball, Mr. G. A. Atkins, Professor
J. A. Gunn, Mr. D. Taylor.

Hon. Auditor: Rev. H. B. Loughnan.

Hon. Secretary: Mr. R. A. Miller.

Hon. Treasurer: Miss A. J. Anderson.

Committee: Miss K. Baker, Miss L. Melchie, Mr. F. I. Hartley,
Mr. G. W. Legge.

The first term's meetings took the form of a series on "Might and Right", papers being read by Miss D. M. Davies on "Individual and State", Mr. A. W. Nicholls on "Class and State", Rev. J. E. Warfe on "Church and State", and Mr. W. Macmahon Ball on "World and State".

The remaining part of the year's syllabus is as follows:

June 12th: Rev. H. B. Loughnan on "St. Thomas Aquinas".

July 10th: Miss Rona Blogg on "The Basis of Realism in Art"
(lantern lecture).

July 24: Mr. D. Taylor on "The Nature of Right Action".

October 2: Professor A. Boyce Gibson on "The Conception of
Eternity".

A combined meeting with the Literature Club will be held on 25th June, when Mr. Joseph Shatin will give an address on "The Philosophy of Dostoieffsky".

The meetings are held in the University Club House at 8 p.m.